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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The common law has traditionally restricted the admission at
trial of evidence of earlier offenses committed by the defendant.
However, evidence of this sort frequently provides critical infor-
mation concerning the character and dispositions of the accused,
and may be unquestionably relevant in assessing the validity of
the charges against him. The probative value of prior-crimes evi-
dence on these points is recognized in all contexts other than
trials, including pretrial release decisions and posttrial sentenc-
ing decisions, in which the defendant's past commission of
crimes is regularly relied on as evidence of an enhanced likeli-
hood of subsequent criminality. Moreover, in many foreign de-
mocracies, whose political and legal systems are premised on the
same values as those of the United States, the criminal records
of defendants are routinely disclosed at trial.
The conflict between normal canons of rational judgment and
the common law's traditional presumption in favor of concealing
the defendant's history of criminal conduct from the trier has
resulted in the development of exceptions and qualifications
under which conviction records and other evidence of prior
crimes are in fact admitted at trial in a variety of circumstances.
However, these exceptions largely reflect ad hoc compromises
and historical accidents, and the admissibility or inadmissibility
of a criminal record pursuant to the existing rules frequently has
little or no relationship to its actual probative value in a case. In
many cases in which such evidence is of major import to an ac-
curate determination of guilt or innocence, it remains subject to
exclusion.
The restriction of prior-crimes evidence has traditionally been
justified as necessary to ensure that defendants have fair notice
of the accusations they will face at trial, to maintain reasonable
limits on the scope of inquiry at trial, and to avoid the risk that
juries will be prejudiced by disclosure of the defendant's past
misconduct. However, the fair notice and scope-of-inquiry
rationales provide no support for the particular standards that
currently govern the admission of such evidence, and any legiti-
mate concerns they reflect could be addressed by measures other
than broad rules of evidence exclusion. These concerns are not
implicated at all by the disclosure at trial of past convic-
tions-as opposed to evidence of previously unproven of-
fenses-since the defendant has already had an opportunity to
defend against the charges on which his prior convictions are
based, and their occurrence can normally be established without
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difficulty by public record or the defendant's admission. The fi-
nal conventional rationale for limiting evidence of earlier of-
fenses-the notion that this type of evidence, though relevant
and probative, should be excluded because it carries an ex-
traordinary potential for jury prejudice-is simply unproven. To
the extent that empirical data is available on this issue, it sug-
gests a contrary conclusion.
Neither the text and history of the Constitution nor the gen-
eral course of judicial decisions provide any support for the view
that the Constitution requires a restrictive approach to the use
of prior-crimes evidence. The Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions affirmatively support the proposition that valid prior
convictions can constitutionally be admitted whenever they are
relevant to the determination of guilt or innocence or some other
legitimate purpose is served by admitting them.
In formulating a reform proposal in this area, a choice is re-
quired between (i) proposing changes that would only enlarge
the circumstances under which prior convictions are admitted,
and (ii) proposing changes that would also create more liberal
rules of admissibility for evidence of unproven offenses for
which a person has never been prosecuted and for evidence of
noncriminal "bad acts." The case for broader admissibility of
convictions is clearly the most compelling, and changing the
rules governing evidence of past misconduct that has not been
established by a criminal conviction would raise a variety of
practical problems and policy questions that do not arise under
reform proposals which only affect the admission of convictions.
It would accordingly be preferable to limit any initial proposal
we might advance to proposing a broader rule of admissibility
for prior convictions, although more permissive standards of ad-
mission would in principle be desirable for other evidence of un-
charged misconduct as well.
The optimum reform affecting convictions would be a rule au-
thorizing the uniform admission at trial of the prior criminal
convictions of defendants and other persons whose conduct or
credibility are at issue in a case. The Department should sup-
port an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would
implement this reform. An amendment of this sort could be
adopted either through legislation or through rulemaking by the
Supreme Court, and state officials could be encouraged to seek
the enactment of comparable reforms in their jurisdictions.
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"It may almost be said that it is because of the indubitable rele-
vancy of specific bad acts showing the character of the accused
that such evidence is excluded. . . .[Flor nearly three centuries,
ever since the liberal reaction that began with the restoration of
the Stuarts, this policy of exclusion .. .has received judicial
sanction .
-Wigmore's Evidence'
"Alongside the general principle that prior offenses are inadmis-
sible, despite their relevance to guilt. . . the common law devel-
oped broad, vaguely defined exceptions. . . whose application is
left largely to the discretion of the trial judge . . . .In short, the
common law, like our decision in [Spencer v. Texas], implicitly
recognized that any unfairness resulting from admitting prior
convictions was more often than not balanced by its probative
value and permitted the prosecution to introduce such evidence
without demanding any particularly strong justification."
-Marshall v. Lonberger2
"[S]omewhere along the way the system has lost track of the
simple truth that it is supposed to be fair and to protect those
who obey the law while punishing those who break it. . . .You
expect the trial to be a search for the truth; you find that it is a
performance orchestrated by lawyers and the judge, with the
jury hearing only half the facts. . . .The jury is never told that
-the defendant has two prior convictions for the same offense and
has been to prison three times for other crimes."
-President's Task Force on Victims of Crime8
1. 1A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58.2, at 1212-13 (Tillers rev. 1983).
2. 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6 (1983).
3. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT vi, 9 (1983).
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THE ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL
HISTORIES AT TRIAL
INTRODUCTION
As part of a continuing series of studies on impediments to
the search for truth in criminal investigation and adjudication,
the Office of Legal Policy has carried out a review of the law
governing the admission of the criminal records of defendants
and other persons at trial." The results of this review are set out
in this Report.
Part I of the Report examines the historical development of
the rules relating to the admission of evidence of prior offenses
at trial and the contemporary rules that have resulted from this
development. The general import of this historical review is that
this area of the law has been characterized by a constant tension
between an early established presumption against admitting evi-
dence of prior offenses and a desire to use such evidence on ac-
count of its obvious probative value in many contexts. This has
resulted in the development of exceptions and qualifications to
the rule of exclusion which admit such evidence under a variety
of circumstances.
Part II examines the question of admitting evidence of prior
offenses from the standpoint of policy. The conclusions of this
section are that the use of such evidence is generally warranted
on account of its relevance to the determination of guilt or inno-
cence; that the reasons customarily given for limiting the use of
eidence of prior offenses have limited persuasive force; and that
the existing rules in this area are a crazy quilt of unprincipled
restrictions and exceptions. Where the evidence to be admitted
is the record of a prior conviction-as opposed to evidence of an
4. The earlier papers in the 'Truth in Criminal Justice' series are: OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 1, The
Law of Pretrial Interrogation (1986), [hereinafter REPORT No. 1], reprinted in 22 U.
MICH. J.L. RF. 437 (1989); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 2, The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule
(1986), reprinted in 22 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 3, The Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L
REP. 661 (1989).
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unproven offense or noncriminal "bad act"-the policy consider-
ations supporting admission are particularly cogent and the ar-
guments for exclusion are particularly weak.
Part III examines the constitutional issues that have been
raised in this area of the law. The principal conclusion is that
there are no constitutional limitations on the admission at trial
of constitutionally valid prior convictions.
Part IV examines the rules relating to prior-crimes evidence in
foreign jurisdictions. In England, the admission of such evidence
now depends primarily on its probative value. In many of the
European democracies, including countries that use lay jurors or
juries in criminal cases, the defendant's criminal record is uni-
formly admissible.
Part V recommends that the Department support a uniform
rule of admission for the prior convictions of defendants and
other persons whose conduct or credibility are at issue in crimi-
nal cases. This Part contains a proposed amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence that would implement this recommenda-
tion and an analysis of the proposed amendment.
I. EvOLUTION OF THE LAW RELATING TO EVIDENCE OF PRIOR
OFFENSES
A. The Historical Development
1. The Common Law
Prior to the late seventeenth century, there was no rule or
practice in criminal cases excluding evidence of other crimes
committed by the.defendant. In the 1680s, however, cases ap-
peared in which witnesses were prevented by the court from tes-
tifying about alleged offenses of the defendant that were not
charged in the indictment. In connection with treason, this
changed perspective was reflected in a statute of 1695 that lim-
ited the admission of evidence of overt acts other than the acts
with which the defendant had been formally charged. The ra-
tionale given for these initial restrictions on prior-crimes evi-
dence was the need to ensure fair notice to the defendant. In the
absence of such limitations, it was stated, a defendant could ef-
fectively be put on trial for acts extending over the whole course
[VOL. 22:3 & 4
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of his life, and would not have a fair opportunity to prepare a
defense to the accusations against him.5
Notwithstanding these concerns, the common law rule against
admitting evidence of uncharged offenses was not absolute. For
example, in prosecutions for passing forged checks or counterfeit
money, efforts by the defendant to pass other forged checks or
bills would be admitted as evidence of his knowledge that the
particular instrument he was charged with passing was bogus.
The admission of evidence of uncharged offenses in such cases
was justified by the difficulty of proving the subjective element
of the offense if the defendant's prior conduct could not be
shown.'
In the nineteenth century, the volume of reported cases relat-
ing to the admissibility of prior acts of the defendant increased
enormously, and there was a corresponding increase in the range
of situations in which specific case law support could be found
for the admission of evidence of other crimes. For example,
courts found such evidence admissible where relevant to show
the defendant's "intent," "knowledge," or "motive," the "ab-
sence of mistake or accident," a "common scheme" in the com-
mission of a series of offenses, or the "identity" of the offender.
While the early nineteenth century development was, in this
sense, expansive as to admissibility, it also carried the seeds of a
later restrictive development. Efforts to synthesize prior case law
and arrive at a comprehensive formulation resulted in a ten-
dency by courts to regard the admission of prior crimes as gov-
erned by a general rule of exclusion, subject to a closed list of
exceptions.7 This became the dominant view in the United
States in the early part of the twentieth century, though a divi-
sion of authority persisted on this point.8
5. See IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58.2, at 1212-13 & nn.1-2 (Tillers rev. 1983);
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954,
958-59 (1933); see also United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1282 (1795); Walker v. Com-
monwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 575-76, 579-80 (1829).
6. See Rex v. Whiley, 168 Eng. Rep. 589 (18041; Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L. REv. 988, 993-96 (1938). See generally
Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidence in Federal
Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 713, 718-19 (1981).
7. See Reed, supra note 6, at 723-35; Stone, supra note 5, at 965-66.
8. See E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:27 (1984) (listing
eighteen states as traditionally rejecting the restrictive approach).
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2. Codifications of the Law of Evidence
Two influential articles written by Julius Stone in the 1930s
provided the theoretical basis for a counterattack on the pre-
dominant, restrictive approach to the admission of prior-crimes
evidence.9 In these articles, Professor Stone argued that this ap-
proach reflected a later "spurious" development of the rules of
evidence. The authentic common-law rule, in his view, only ex-
cluded evidence of other offenses when it was relevant solely to
establish a general propensity on the part of a defendant to
commit a certain type of crime, and to invite the inference that
his guilt of a currently charged offense was made more probable
by such a propensity. The so-called "exceptions" that had been
recognized in early decisions-evidence of "motive," "intent,"
"knowledge," etc.-were not actually a closed set of exceptions
to a general rule of exclusion, but only examples of types of situ-
ations in which prior offenses are relevant to a defendant's guilt
or innocence other than by showing criminal propensity. As a
matter of both history and sound policy, Stone argued, the ad-
mission of prior-crimes evidence should depend on the general
purpose for which it is offered, as opposed to inclusion in a fixed
list of exceptions: If it is only relevant to establish criminal pro-
pensity based on past criminal conduct, it should be excluded. If
it is relevant to guilt or innocence in some other manner, it
should be admissible.
The approach advocated by Professor Stone has come to be
known as the "inclusionary" version of the rule, as opposed to
the "exclusionary" approach which predominated in the United
States at the time his articles were written. The "inclusionary"
approach has been increasingly influential in recent decades and
has affected the formulation of the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 Federal Rule 404(b), for exam-
ple, provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
9. See Stone, supra note 5; Stone, supra note 6.
10. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§§ 5231 n.33, 5239 nn.18-22 (1978) (Uniform Rule 55 and Model Rule 311).
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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident.
This is naturally understood as a formulation of the "inclu-
sionary" approach. Other crimes are not admissible to support
an inference of criminal conduct from the defendant's character
evidenced by his prior conduct, but criminal history is admissi-
ble when it is relevant for some other purpose. A list of other
purposes for which such evidence may be admitted is included
in the rule, but it is only a set of examples, rather than an exclu-
sive set of exceptions to a general rule of exclusion. Evidence of
other crimes is admissible under the rule for any purpose other
than showing a propensity to criminal conduct, even if the pur-
pose is not one that the rule explicitly mentions."1
At the state level, the contemporary trend has also been to-
ward the adoption of the inclusionary approach. Rules modeled
on Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) have been widely adopted by the
states. 12
B. The Admission Of Prior-Crimes Evidence Under Current
Law
The "exception" categories under which prior-crimes evidence
has conventionally been admitted remain important even in ju-
risdictions that follow the "inclusionary" approach, because
these categories identify particularly common situations in
which prior offenses may be relevant to the truth of a criminal
charge by some means other than an inference concerning pro-
pensity. Moreover, it is easier as a practical matter to secure the
admission of such evidence if it fits into a conventional pigeon-
hole that may be explicitly mentioned as an example of proper
use in a codified rule. There are also a number of special rules
sanctioning the use of evidence of prior offenses that are ac-
cepted in both inclusionary and exclusionary jurisdictions. The
11. Most federal circuits have interpreted Rule 404 in the obvious inclusionary sense.
See United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 987 & n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61,
63 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d
422, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Beechurn, 582 F.2d 898, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Nolan,
551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1977). See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 2:30.
12. See generally E. IMWINKELRMD, supra note 8, §§ 2:28-30; id. appendix.
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main grounds for admitting this type of evidence under contem-
porary practice in the United States include the following:
1. Rebuttal of a Defendant's Good-Character Evidence
It was established by the early eighteenth century that evi-
dence of the defendant's character may be admitted where the
defendant himself chooses to put his character in issue. Thus, if
the defendant offers evidence of his good character, the prosecu-
tion may offer evidence to the contrary. Specific instances of
misconduct by the defendant, including prior crimes, may be
brought out on cross-examination of defense character
witnesses.13
2. Character as an Ultimate Issue
It has also been recognized since the early eighteenth century
that no special restrictions exist on the admission of relevant ev-
idence of character in cases in which character is an ultimate
issue in the determination of liability. For example, in cases in-
volving the entrapment defense, evidence of similar prior of-
fenses by the defendant is admissible to establish his predisposi-
tion to commit the charged offense. This rule is a corollary of
the fact that the absence of such a disposition is an element of
the entrapment defense."
3. Inseparable Crimes
In describing the commission of a crime with which a defend-
ant-is charged, it is often difficult or impossible to avoid mention
of other uncharged offenses that occurred as part of the same
transaction. For example, "when the victim testifies in a rape
prosecution that the defendant broke into her apartment and
forced her to have sexual relations at gunpoint, her testimony
can be said to describe incidents of burglary, malicious destruc-
13. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), 405(a); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 157-64 (3d ed. 1982); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5268;
Reed, supra note 6, at 717-18 n.20; see also 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 58.2 n.1.
14. See Reed, supra note 6, at 717-18 n.20; FED. R. EvID. 405(b); C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5235.
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tion of property, assault, false imprisonment, and violations of
firearms regulations.' When offenses are interwoven in this
manner, the practical difficulty or impossibility of describing the
charged offense without mentioning other crimes has resulted in
an exception to the rule of exclusion for uncharged offenses. The
catch phrases under which it has been applied are "inseparable
crimes" and "res gestae."'
4. Evidence of a Distinctive Course of Criminal Conduct
Evidence of prior offenses by a defendant is likely to be ad-
mitted where it tends to show that he has committed a series of
crimes of a highly distinctive character or in a highly distinctive
manner. For example, in a prosecution of a person for murdering
a hitchhiker and burying the body in his backyard, it would be
permissible to show that the bodies of other missing hitchhikers
had also been found in the yard. The presence of the "body gar-
den" in such a case would tend to show that all of the victims
had been killed pursuant to someone's practice of picking up
hitchhikers and murdering them, and to identify the defendant
as the responsible individual. Evidence of prior crimes may be
admitted in such cases under conventional exception categories
described by such catch phrases as "common scheme," "plan,"
"modus operandi," or "identity."1
5. Evidence of State of Mind
The rules relating to evidence of other crimes narrowly limit
the use of such evidence to establish that a defendant engaged
in the conduct elements of an offense, but are relatively unre-
strictive in allowing such evidence to show that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind. For example, in a murder
prosecution, the fact that the defendant fired at a witness who
appeared at the crime scene might be admitted as evidence that
the homicide was not an accident, the effort to dispose of a wit-
ness being probative of an intentional killing. Another example
is the historically early practice of admitting evidence of similar
offenses in prosecutions for passing forged checks or counterfeit
15. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5239, at 445.
16. See id. § 5239, at 445-49.
17. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, §§ 3:10-:14; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 10, §§ 5244, 5246.
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money to establish guilty knowledge." A number of the terms in
conventional lists of "exception" categories reflect this more per-
missive attitude toward evidence of state of mind, including "in-
tent," "knowledge," and "absence of mistake or accident."'
The conventional exception category of "motive" reflects an-
other type of use of evidence of prior offenses to show state of
mind. For example, in a murder case, the obvious motive for the
crime might be that the victim had testified against the defen-
dant at an earlier trial which had resulted in the defendant's
conviction and incarceration for drug trafficking. The defend-
ant's conviction for drug trafficking and the victim's role in se-
curing it would probably be admitted in such a case to establish
a motive of retaliation.20
6. Evidence of Criminal Skill or Capacity
Criminal histories are sometimes admitted as evidence of an
unusual skill or capacity which would make it possible for the
defendant to commit the charged offense. For example, in a
prosecution for counterfeiting, prior acts of counterfeiting might
be admitted to show that the defendant possessed the unusual
technical skill required for the commission of such an offense.2
7. Evidence Relating to Credibility
At common law, a person who had been convicted of a felony
or of an offense involving dishonesty (crimen falsi) was perma-
nently disqualified from testifying as a witness in any proceed-
ing. Later statutory developments abrogated this restriction,
substituting a weaker rule that prior convictions are admissible
to impeach the credibility of a witness. When the testimonial
incapacity of defendants was eliminated by statutes enacted in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, it became possible to
treat the defendant who chose to take the stand like other wit-
nesses, and to admit his criminal record or some part of it as
evidence bearing on his credibility. This is generally permitted
in American jurisdictions today, albeit with variations from ju-
18. See supra text accompanying note 6.
19. See E. IMwiNEmLRiFm, supra note 8, §9 5:01-:02, 5:04-:05; C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, supra note 10, §§ 5242, 5245.
20. See E. IMWINKELRIRD, supra note 8, §9 3:15-:18.
21. See id. § 3:03; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5241.
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risdiction to jurisdiction in the types of crimes that can be used
for impeachment. At the federal level, the use of prior convic-
tions for impeachment is authorized by Rule 609 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 2
The general impeachment rule differs significantly from the
other exceptions to the prohibition of prior-crimes evidence in
that it authorizes the admission of prior convictions for im-
peachment, but not evidence of unproven offenses or noncrimi-
nal "bad acts." The other exceptions were developed without
any consideration of possible differences between the implica-
tions of admitting evidence of unproven offenses and the impli-
cations of disclosing the fact that a person has already been con-
victed of other crimes. As a result, they have traditionally
admitted evidence of alleged offenses for which the defendant
has not been prosecuted and evidence of offenses established by
prior convictions under essentially the same standards. In con-
trast, the general impeachment rule only admits convictions to
attack a witness's credibility on account of its derivation from a
rule of testimonial incapacity based on conviction of certain
crimes.'3
8. Evidence of Propensity
American jurisdictions currently divide between the "exclu-
sionary" approach to prior-crimes evidence, under which admis-
sion depends on the applicability of a closed list of exceptions to
a general rule of exclusion, and the "inclusionary" approach,
under which such evidence is admissible unless its sole relevance
is to show a propensity on the defendant's part to engage in
criminal conduct. Even the inclusionary approach, however, is
too narrow to accommodate the actual course of judicial deci-
sions. Courts frequently admit evidence of prior offenses where
its only purpose is to establish criminal propensity.
This approach is most prominent in the area of sex crimes.
The admission of prior-crimes evidence in this area may involve
a straightforward acknowledgment that special rules admitting
evidence of disposition or propensity apply to sex crimes, or may
22. See E. Cleary, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed.
1972); 2 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 519-20 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). See generally REPORT
No. 1, supra note 4, Part I.A.l.b & Part B.2.c (abrogation of testimonial incapacity of
defendants).
23. Offenses that have not resulted in convictions are admissible to attack a witness's
credibility under much more restrictive standards set out in FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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be effected through expansive interpretations of traditional ex-
ception categories in connection with such offenses. 4
A good example is the decision of the Supreme Court of Wyo-
ming in Elliot v. State,' in which the court held that evidence
of prior incidents of child molesting was admissible in a prosecu-
tion for that crime to establish "motive." The concept of "mo-
tive" was defined by the court so as to be essentially synony-
mous with disposition or propensity."6 In the course of the
decision the court observed that
in recent years a preponderance of the courts have sus-
tained the admissibility of the testimony of third persons
as to prior or subsequent similar crimes, wrongs or acts in
cases involving sexual offenses. . . . [I]n cases involving
sexual assaults, such as incest, and statutory rape with
family members as the victims, the courts in recent years
have almost uniformly admitted such testimony."7
Other sources corroborate the assessment that the use of pro-
pensity evidence in prosecutions for sex crimes is widespread. A
contemporary edition of Wigmore's treatise, for example, states
that "the general rule against the use of propensity evidence
against an accused is not honored in sex offense prosecutions.'
II. CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY
This section of the Report examines the principal policy con-
siderations affecting the admission of a defendant's criminal rec-
ord at trial. Part A sets out the general considerations support-
ing the relevance of such evidence in assessing the charges
against a defendant. Part B considers arguments that have been
offered in support of restrictive rules in this area. Part C ana-
lyzes and criticizes the particular rules that govern the use of
prior-crimes evidence under current law.
24. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, §§ 4:11-:18; 1A J. WIGMORB, supra note 5,
§ 62.2; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5239 at 461-62; SToNE, supra note 6,
at 1031-33.
25. 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
26. Id. at 1048-49.
27. Id. at 1047-48.
28. 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 62.2, at 1334-35.
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A. General Grounds Supporting The Relevance Of Criminal
Histories
The restrictive rules that currently govern the admission of
prior-crimes evidence in trials in the United States involve a de-
parture from the practice in other social contexts in which judg-
ments must be made concerning possible misconduct by others
based on evidence. For example, an employer, a teacher, or a
parent, in assessing the probability of misconduct by a person in
his charge, would regard the past conduct of that person in like
matters as a highly relevant piece of information, and would
consider it impossible to make an intelligent and fully informed
decision if such information were withheld. The probative value
of past conduct is also recognized at the various stages of the
criminal justice process other than trials. In pretrial release deci-
sions and posttrial sentencing decisions, for example, a defen-
dant's criminal history is regularly considered as a factor indi-
cating an enhanced probability of continued criminal activity.29
The reasons why we normally consider such information im-
portant are not difficult to discern. Evidence of prior wrongdoing
by a person informs judgments concerning his later commission
of similar acts in a number of obvious ways.
1. Evidence of Moral Character
Ordinary people do not commit outrages against the persons
or property of others because they believe that it is wrong to do
so and restrict their conduct accordingly. The fact that a person
has committed crimes in the past shows that he lacked these
normal moral convictions, or that they were too weak to restrain
his actions. Because human personality has some degree of sta-
bility, a history of criminality, as evidence of moral character,
may be relevant to the merits of a later charge. The probative
value of a criminal record in this respect tends to be greatest
when the earlier offenses are similar in character or seriousness
to the charged offense. For example, a conviction for income tax
evasion shows some anti-social tendency, but has limited bearing
on the probable truth or falsity of a charge of rape. In compari-
son, prior convictions of similar sex crimes tend to show that a
29. The free use of prior offenses as evidence of criminal propensity in judicial pro-
ceedings other than trials is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 52-56.
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person lacks moral inhibitions that would prevent him from
committing rapes, and enhance the credibility of such a charge.
2. Evidence of Willingness to Risk the Consequences of
Criminality
Committing crimes takes a certain amount of nerve, or at least
some degree of insensitivity to the potential consequences of do-
ing so. At a minimum, criminality entails a risk of penal conse-
quences, including apprehension, restraint of liberty or other
punishment, and the stigma and collateral disabilities that at-
tend conviction. Certain types of criminality carry additional
risks. For example, violent crimes commonly involve a danger of
resistance by the victim or others, or the possibility that the po-
lice may appear and use force in effecting an apprehension. A
criminal record accordingly may be relevant to the probable
truth or falsity of a current charge as evidence that the defen-
dant is willing to take the risks associated with criminality or is
heedless of those risks.
3. Evidence of Desires and Impulses
The commission of crimes tends to show that a person desires
the ends they achieve, and that these desires are strong enough
to impel the individual to bear the risks of criminality and to
overcome whatever moral scruples he may have against engaging
in crime. For example, the commission of rape or child molesting
indicates that the perpetrator possesses the unusual sexual
desires or aggressive impulses that are gratified through the
commission of such crimes, and crimes of fraud or embezzlement
evidence a desire for money which is strong enough to offset the
risk of obtaining it illicitly. A defendant's past commission of
similar offenses accordingly tends to show that he has desires or
impulses which could motivate him to commit such crimes
again.
4. Evidence of Habitual Activity
Finally, prior criminality may be relevant as evidence of "pro-
pensity" in the narrow sense-the likelihood that a person will
do something again simply because it is a familiar activity that
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he has engaged in in the past. Since human beings are, to some
extent, creatures of habit, inferences of this sort are regularly
drawn as a matter of common sense. For example, if a person
has made his living as a burglar in the past, there is an enhanced
probability that he will turn to burglary again when he needs
income, in comparison with a person who has not previously en-
gaged in that activity.
The foregoing considerations are the most obvious ways in
which prior criminality tends to bolster the plausibility of the
charges against a defendant. They are, however, generally ex-
cluded from consideration by the rules which currently govern
the admission of a defendant's criminal record. Moral character,
willingness to risk the consequences of criminality, characteristic
desires or impulses, and habitual activities"0 would all be classi-
fied as elements of "character" or "propensity," and prior con-
victions are normally excluded as evidence on these points. Be-
cause, in every other context, we consider the past conduct of a
person suspected of wrongdoing important precisely because of
the bearing it has on these questions of character or propensity,
the observance of a contrary rule in the context of criminal trials
is, on its face, perplexing. An examination of the rationales that
have traditionally been offered for restricting evidence of prior
offenses does little to dispel this perplexity.
B. Reasons Given For Restricting Evidence Of Prior Crimes
Restrictions on the admission of evidence of prior offenses or
other "bad acts" by a defendant have traditionally been sup-
ported on three grounds: the need to ensure that a defendant
has fair notice of the accusations to which he must respond; the
need to place a reasonable limit on the scope of inquiry at trial;
and the risk that a defendant will be prejudiced in the eyes of
the jury if prior misconduct on his part is disclosed."'
30. Under FED. R Evm. 406, evidence of "habit" is admissible, but "habit" under
that rule refers to a person's regular response to a repeated specific situation. Habitual
criminal activity is not habit in the relevant sense. See FED. R EvI. 406, Advisory Com-
mittee's Note.
31. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); G. WILLIAMS,
Tan PROOF OF GUILT 213-15 (1963).
Journal of Law Reform
1. Fair Notice
The concern over fair notice to defendants provided the impe-
tus for the initial development of restrictions on evidence of un-
charged offenses in the late seventeenth century.82 It has rou-
tinely been reiterated in later justifications for these restrictions.
In the absence of such limitations, it has been argued, a defend-
ant could be confronted at trial with evidence implicating him in
an unpredictable range of prior acts of misconduct extending
over the whole course of his life, and would be denied a fair op-
portunity to prepare a defense to the accusations he would face
at trial.
The force of this concern depends in part on whether the evi-
dence to be offered is evidence of unproven offenses or evidence
of prior convictions. In relation to unproven offenses, the fair
notice concern is not entirely without force, though it is difficult
to say precisely how much weight it should be accorded. The
question is not one of fair notice to the defendant of the charge
for which he is being tried-an explicit requirement of the sixth
amendment-but of notice that other alleged offenses may be
introduced as evidence of the defendant's commission of the
charged offense. In contrast to the practice of many foreign ju-
risdictions, which generally require the parties in a criminal case
to disclose their contentions and evidence before trial,"8 the par-
ties to criminal proceedings in the United States are largely free
to keep their evidence to themselves until they are ready to use
it." This naturally results in a greater potential for surprise at
trial than exists under a full disclosure system, and may require
each party to engage in guesswork about what evidence the
other party will offer.
While the limited character of evidence disclosure require-
ments in criminal cases in the United States is not beyond criti-
cism, it must be kept in mind in assessing the force of argu-
ments against admitting evidence of uncharged offenses on fair
notice grounds. Prior notice is not generally required of an in-
tent to offer other types of evidence against a defendant, and no
notice requirement has traditionally been imposed in admitting
evidence of other offenses under the numerous conventional ex-
32. See supra text accompanying note 5.
33. See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 506, 533-36 (1973).
34. But cf, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2, 16 (pretrial notice and disclosure
requirements).
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ceptions to the general rule excluding such evidence. Taken for
all it might be worth, the fair notice concern could support a
requirement of pretrial notice of intent to offer evidence of un-
proven prior offenses in certain circumstances. It does not other-
wise provide any support for the exclusion of such evidence.,
In relation to the admission of prior convictions-as opposed
to evidence of unproven offenses-the fair notice point has no
force at all. The defendant has already had notice of the charge
underlying a conviction in the earlier proceeding which resulted
in an adjudication of his guilt on that charge, and has either
chosen to forego his right to defend against the charge or has
exercised that right unsuccessfully. The facts established by a
prior conviction cannot be contested by the defendant when it is
admitted in evidence at a later trial, and he can logically claim
no right to be notified again of the charges or evidence on which
it was based.,"
It might nevertheless be urged that unfair surprise of a differ-
ent sort could result from the admission of a prior conviction, on
the ground that the defense may wish to be prepared to offer
some evidence or explanation that would mitigate the prior of-
fense's import as evidence of the defendant's commission of the
currently charged offense, or to contest the accuracy of the pub-
lic record which is offered to prove the conviction. This point,
however, also provides no support either for a restrictive ap-
proach to admitting prior convictions or for special notice re-
quirements when such evidence is to be used. Under a general
rule of admissibility for prior convictions, defense counsel would
have to expect that the government would put the defendant's
criminal record in evidence routinely, and would have to be pre-
pared to address its significance. At least in relation to federal
proceedings, there is also no problem of preparedness to chal-
lenge the accuracy of the record of convictions offered by the
government, because the defense can obtain the government's
record of the defendant's convictions before trial.3 7
35. Most American jurisdictions continue to follow the traditional practice under
which pretrial disclosure of an intent to offer evidence of other offenses is not required.
However, a limited number of states have adopted pretrial notice requirements in this
context. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 9:09.
36. See 3A J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 980, at 828 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(b).
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2. Limiting the Scope of Inquiry at Trial
The second traditional argument for limiting prior-crimes evi-
dence is the need for reasonable limitations on the scope of in-
quiry at trial. The general sense of this argument is that admit-
ting such evidence could turn trials into prolonged explorations
into the defendant's personal history in which the proper focus
of the proceedings on the matters most directly relevant to the
charged offense would be lost in argumentation and contrary of-
fers of proof concerning other alleged misconduct by the
defendant.
As support for a generally restrictive approach to prior-crimes
evidence, this argument presupposes that maintaining an appro-
priate scope and focus in criminal proceedings is best accom-
plished through a broad exclusionary rule, as opposed to more
discriminating judgments by trial courts concerning the value of
such evidence and the effects of admitting it. 8 Be that as it
may, the force of this argument, like the "fair notice" argument,
is essentially limited to evidence of unproven offenses and non-
criminal bad acts, whose occurrence can be controverted by the
defense. It offers no reason for limiting the admission of prior
convictions, because they are necessarily limited in number,
their predicate facts cannot be contested by the defense in a
later trial, and their occurrence can normally be established by
public record or the defendant's admission." The regular admis-
sion of the criminal records of witnesses "for impeachment"
under current law'0 supports the conclusion that the admission
of prior convictions is not unduly time-consuming or distracting.
3. The Risk of Prejudice
The final traditional rationale for excluding evidence of prior
offenses is its supposedly prejudicial effect on juries. Specifically,
it is alleged both that juries are likely to accord prior offenses
more weight than they rationally merit as evidence of a defen-
dant's guilt of the charged offense, and that juries are likely to
38. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its potential for confusing the issues, causing prejudice, or
wasting time).
39. See 3A J. WIoMO.E, supra note 36, § 980, at 828; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at
213-14.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
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convict a defendant maliciously on account of antagonism re-
sulting from disclosure of his prior offenses, though not per-
suaded of his guilt of the currently charged offense under the
applicable standard of proof. Before turning to the substance of
this contention, two types of fallacious argument that have been
offered in support of the "prejudicial" character of prior-crimes
evidence should be noted.
First, writers have sometimes put forward information which
indicates that admitting a defendant's criminal record increases
the likelihood of conviction, and have suggested that this fact in
itself shows that such evidence is "prejudicial" and should be
restricted. 41 This argument, however, confuses the question
whether prior-crimes evidence is prejudicial with the question
whether it has probative value. The fact that the use of a certain
type of evidence increases the likelihood of conviction in no way
implies that its significance as evidence of guilt is likely to be
overestimated or that it is likely to result in lawless convictions
based on antagonism. It is equally true, for example, that the
admission of eyewitness testimony or fingerprint evidence
against a defendant increases the likelihood that he will be con-
victed, but no one would suggest that this shows that these types
of evidence are "prejudicial" in any objectionable sense, or im-
plies that they should be presumptively inadmissible."
Second, writers sometimes point to particular cases in which
innocent defendants were mistakenly convicted, and in which
evidence of prior offenses was admitted, as showing that such
evidence is prejudicial and should be excluded. 3 Even putting
aside the speculative nature of the assumption that the defen-
dants in these cases would have been acquitted if their earlier
crimes had been concealed from the trier, the existence of rare
cases of this sort does not support a presumption against the use
of such evidence. It is equally possible to point to isolated cases
in which innocent people have mistakenly been convicted on the
basis of eyewitness testimony, circumstantial evidence, and
other types of evidence that are admitted routinely."
41. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 1:02; see also id. § 1:03.
42. See Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 535,
543-45 (1974).
43. See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xv-xvi & n.21 (1961); G. WILLIAMS,
supra note 31, at 215-16.
44. In E. BORCHARD, supra note 43, at viii,.xiii-xv, the author concluded that the main
causes of erroneous convictions in the cases surveyed were mistaken identifications, erro-
neous inferences from circumstantial evidence, and perjury.
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In general, the fact that evidence of prior offenses tends to
support an inference of guilt on a later charged offense does not
rationally support its exclusion or limitation. Rather, the proba-
tive value of such evidence in establishing guilt is precisely the
consideration that supports its admission.' 5 A special rule of ex-
clusion would be justified only if it could be shown that the risk
of overestimation or antagonism is substantially greater in con-
nection with prior-crimes evidence than with other types of evi-
dence of comparable importance that are not subject to special
exclusionary rules. To complete the argument, it would also be
necessary to show that the likelihood that innocent defendants
will be convicted as a result of such prejudice is sufficiently great
that it outweighs the value of admitting prior-crimes evidence in
securing the conviction of the guilty, and that the risk of
prejudice resulting from such evidence cannot be brought within
acceptable bounds by means short of exclusion, such as caution-
ary instructions to the jury.
While the notion that evidence of other offenses carries such
an extraordinary risk of prejudice has acquired the status of
dogma through sheer force of repetition, there is really no reason
to believe that such a risk exists. Information bearing on this
issue appears in Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, a
study which analyzed reports on 3576 jury trials by the judges
who presided at those trials. The reports indicated that in 47%
of all cases the defendant in fact had a criminal record, and in
28% of all cases the jury knew that the defendant had such a
record.'6
45. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
46. The figure of 47% for defendants with criminal records can be derived directly
from figures given in the study. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN Jutv 145 &
n.12 (1966). The 47% figure relates to a subuniverse of 3528 cases, rather than the full
study sample of 3576 cases, since judges failed to provide information concerning the
defendant's criminal history (or lack of it) in 48 cases.
The figure of 28% for cases in which the jury knew that the defendant had a criminal
record is derived from Table 44 in id. at 147, which states that criminal records were
disclosed in 59% of the cases in which the defendant in fact had a record. Multiplying
the figure of 47% for cases in which the defendant in fact had a record by 59% gives a
figure of 28% for cases in which the jury knew that the defendant had a record. This
figure is to some degree approximate: As noted above, the 47% figure for defendants
with records related to a subuniverse which excluded some cases, and additional cases
were excluded from Table 44. Specifically, the 59% figure for disclosure of records in
Table 44 related to a subuniverse of 1534 cases in which the defendant in fact had a
criminal record, in contrast to a total figure of 1658 cases in which it was reported that
the defendants had records. See id. at 145. The discrepancy is presumably the result of
the omission of other information in some of the judges' reports that was required in
compiling Table 44. However, the cases excluded were a small part of the total sample,
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Notwithstanding the jury's frequent awareness of the defen-
dant's criminal record, jury verdicts which disagreed with the
verdict that the judge would have entered were overwhelmingly
in favor of the defendant. In 16.9% of the cases the jury acquit-
ted where the judge would have convicted, but in only 2.2% did
the jury convict where the judge would have acquitted.4 More-
over, virtually all of the cases in the small class in which the jury
was less favorable to the defendant were characterized by the
judge as being close on the evidence.48 Thus, the findings of the
study tend to support the proposition that (1) there are few
cases of any sort in which a jury will convict where the judge
would acquit, and (2) there are virtually no cases in which mis-
estimations of the evidence by the jury or antagonism toward
the defendant result in guilty verdicts that are factually indefen-
sible from the standpoint of the judge's assessment of the case,
even though juries are aware of the defendant's criminal record
in a large proportion of all cases.4"
and there is no reason to believe that the bottom line figures would have differed signifi-
cantly had the same information been available for all the cases in the study sample.
47. See id. at 56; see also id. at 55-62, 168-90 (describing and analyzing greater le-
niency of juries and greater disposition to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant);
Damaska, supra note 33, at 538-39 & n.72 (comparable phenomenon in European
systems).
48. See H. KALVEN & H. ZmSEL, supra note 46, at 376-77, 381 (96% of cases in which
judge would have entered more lenient verdict than jury characterized as close on the
evidence); see also id. at 412 (judges who would have entered more lenient verdicts than
juries nevertheless let the jury verdict stand 90% of the time); id. at 431 (judges charac-
terized jury verdicts as "without merit" in only 7% of cases in which they would have
entered more lenient verdicts).
There were only four cases in the study in which the judge characterized the evidence
as clear for acquittal but in which the jury convicted. All of these cases involved plausi-
ble reasons for the disagreement that were unrelated to the disclosure of criminal
records. See id. at 404-05 & n.11.
49. The Kalven and Zeisel study elsewhere characterized its findings as supporting
the traditionally restrictive approach to disclosure of a defendant's criminal record. Id.
at 389-90. However, this assertion was based on data indicating that in five cases out of
forty-eight in which the judge was more lenient than the jury, the disagreement could be
attributed to the jury's differing reaction from the judge to the defendant's failure to
take the stand or to the disclosure of his criminal record. This data clearly does not
support the stated conclusion, since it does not distinguish between reaction to a failure
to take the stand and reaction to the disclosure of a criminal record. Even if this meth-
odological defect is put aside, the cited discrepancy. could equally well be explained by
hypotheses involving no greater likelihood of jury prejudice-for example, simple differ-
ences of opinion between juries and judges concerning the import of a defendant's si-
lence or criminal record in a few close cases, or a slightly greater willingness of judges to
abide by legal rules barring rationally warranted inferences from a defendant's failure to
testify or from his criminal record. See generally id. at 143-44 (rules barring adverse
inferences from defendant's failure to take the stand); REPORT No. 1, supra note 4, Part
IB.2.c. (same subject); supra text accompanying notes 9-30 (existing rules generally pre-
clude giving prior offenses their natural probative force and require that they only be
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While the supposed risk of prejudice is simply unsupported in
relation to any type of prior-crimes evidence, it is particularly
weak as an argument against the admission of convictions. As
noted above, one form of prejudice that allegedly results from
the admission of past misconduct is the risk that a jury will, in
effect, convict a defendant to punish him for his prior crimes,
though not persuaded of his guilt of the charged offense under
the applicable standard of proof.50 For example, suppose that in
a prosecution for selling narcotics, evidence is introduced that
the defendant has a prior history of involvement in drug traf-
ficking. In such a case, the argument runs, a jury might see no
injustice in convicting him of the charged offense, though not
persuaded of his guilt on the charge, on the ground that he de-
serves to be punished for his earlier alleged crimes.
However, any risk that a jury might unjustifiably convict a de-
fendant to punish him for earlier offenses is reduced where the
earlier crimes are evidenced by convictions, since in such a case
the defendant has already been punished for those crimes. For
example, in the drug trafficking case described above, suppose
that the evidence admitted consists of one or more prior convic-
tions for drug offenses. In such a case the trier would be aware
that the defendant has already been brought to justice for his
earlier crimes, and accordingly could have relatively little incen-
tive to convict him lawlessly of the charged offense on inade-
quate evidence to punish him for those crimes.
C. Critique Of Existing Rules
In the decision of Michelson v. United States, the Supreme
Court characterized the conventional rules governing the use of
character evidence as a "grotesque structure" which is "archaic,
paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by
which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly-
reasoned counter-privilege to the other."'51 Our review of the
rules governing the admission of criminal histories supports a
considered as evidence concerning credibility or other limited issues); in/ra text accom-
panying notes 68-70 (juries may not comply with limiting instructions concerning per-
missible inferences from prior crimes evidence).
50. This is the supposed risk that a jury will unjustifiably convict a defendant on the
basis of antagonism because he is perceived to be of "bad character" if his criminal his-
tory is disclosed. The other form of prejudice that allegedly results from prior crimes
evidence is the risk that such evidence will be taken by juries for more than it is ration-
ally worth as evidence of guilt.
51. 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
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similar characterization. The existing standards in this area are
characterized by unprincipled restrictions, a heavy reliance on
fictions, and internal inconsistencies and incoherencies. The
main anomalies include the following:
1. Inconsistency with Rules Admitting Propensity Evidence
in other Proceedings
In many types of judicial proceedings a defendant's criminal
history is regularly relied on as an important indication that he
will persist in criminality if not adequately deterred or re-
strained. Against this free use of propensity evidence in other
contexts, the adoption of a contrary rule for criminal trials bears
some burden of justification. Posttrial sentencing proceedings,
pretrial release proceedings, and civil commitment proceedings
for dangerous offenders illustrate this point.
a. Sentencing- In sentencing, the defendant's criminal rec-
ord is routinely considered as an important factor in deciding on
the appropriate sanction. This is reflected in the sentencing
practices of individual judges, in recidivist statutes which au-
thorize or require enhanced penalties for defendants with crimi-
nal records, and in statutes governing the formulation of sen-
tencing guidelines. 2
Under these rules and practices, the sentencing authority
takes prior convictions as establishing an enhanced probability
that an offender will later commit other crimes, and accordingly
as showing a need for stricter correctional measures. If the de-
fendant's criminal record is admitted at trial and given its natu-
ral probative force, the trier similarly takes prior convictions as
establishing an enhanced probability that the defendant subse-
quently committed the crime with which he is charged. In either
case, the inference is from a record of earlier criminal conduct to
an enhanced probability of subsequent criminal conduct. Con-
sidering that this type of inference is universally accepted as
valid in the context of sentencing proceedings, it is difficult to
52. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982) ("No limitation shall be placed on the informa-
tion concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an of-
fense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence."); 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b), (e)(1) (1982) (enhanced pen-
alty authorization for offenders with serious criminal records under "dangerous special
offender" statute); 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(10), (h)-(j) (Supp. IV 1986) (formulation of sen-
tencing guidelines).
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see why it is regarded with such suspicion in the context of
trials.
A distinction that might be urged between trials and sentenc-
ing proceedings is that the ultimate decisionmaker at trial is
often a lay jury rather than a judge. However, juries may be in-
formed of a defendant's prior convictions in sentencing proceed-
ings in jurisdictions in which they do serve as sentencing bod-
ies. As noted above, there is no reason to believe that juries are
more likely than judges to overestimate the significance of crimi-
nal histories to the detriment of defendants, and juries are gen-
erally more disposed to leniency and less conviction-prone than
judges.54
b. Pretrial release decisions- Pretrial release proceedings
are another context in which prior offenses are considered as evi-
dence of criminal propensity. This point appears with particular
clarity in the modern type of bail statute, which authorizes the
consideration of dangerousness in setting release conditions or
denying release. A defendant's prior offenses are treated by such
statutes as significant indications that he may engage in further
acts dangerous to the public if not adequately restrained pend-
ing trial.15
The same point is illustrated by the conventional authoriza-
tion in bail statutes for considering the risk of flight. Under such
provisions, the fact that a person has failed to appear in court in
the past is treated as an indication that more restrictive release
conditions should be imposed or that release should be denied.56
This is simply an inference based on a defendant's past commis-
sion of the crime of bail-jumping5 7 that he has a propensity to
commit that crime, and is likely to commit it again if not ade-
quately restrained.
c. Civil commitment of dangerous offenders- A final illus-
tration is provided by provisions authorizing the civil commit-
53. This occurs regularly in capital cases, and may be specially authorized in jurisdic-
tions in which juries have broader sentencing functions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1005
(1977) (convictions admitted in jury sentencing of habitual offenders); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.080 (Michie 1985); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1981)
(criminal records admissible in penalty determinations by juries).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)-(3), (f)(1)(d), (g)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3148(b) (Supp. IV 1986); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 21, 23, 35-36 (1983);
see also E. IMWINKFLRIED, supra note 8, § 1:06 (admissibility of prior offenses in other
pretrial proceedings).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3) (Supp. IV 1986)(record concerning appearance at
court proceedings to be considered in deciding on release); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 & n.67 (1983).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146.
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ment of dangerous offenders with psychological disorders. One
example is the Illinois procedure for commitment of "sexually
dangerous persons," which was recently considered by the Su-
preme Court in Allen v. Illinois.58 Under that procedure, a men-
tally disordered person can be committed for purposes of treat-
ment and protection of the public if it is shown that he has
"criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses" and
has "demonstrated propensities towards acts of sexual assault or
acts of sexual molestation of children. . . . In establishing the
required propensity, the government may introduce "evidence of
the commission by the respondent of any number of crimes." 60
Though commitment under this procedure is civil in nature, the
determination of sexual dangerousness may be made by a jury,
and the commitment proceeding is procedurally similar to a
criminal trial in various other respects.
Like sentencing and pretrial release proceedings, commitment
procedures of this type recognize the probative value of prior
criminal conduct as evidence of criminal propensity. It is not ap-
parent why the same recognition should not be accorded in the
context of criminal trials.
2. Inconsistency with the Practical Operation of the
"Exception" Categories
In theory, prior crimes are inadmissible in criminal trials as
evidence of criminal propensity. As a practical matter, however,
propensity evidence may be highly probative when taken in con-
junction with the other evidence in a case. This has resulted in
pressures on judges to recognize express exceptions to the no-
evidence-of-propensity rule, or to admit propensity evidence co-
vertly by calling it evidence of something else. This tendency
has been most pronounced in connection with sex crimes," but
it can also be observed in the practical operation of the orthodox
exceptions to the rule excluding such evidence in other areas.
The exception for evidence of a "common scheme" or "modus
operandi" is a good illustration. If, for example, a person is
58. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
59. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 105.
,60. See id. para. 105-5; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); see also Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 420-21 (1979) (admission of criminal acts in Texas civil commitment
proceeding as evidence that mentally ill person requires commitment for his own welfare
and protection of others).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
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charged with drowning his recently married and heavily insured
wife in the bath, there would be little difficulty in securing the
admission of the fact that two earlier heavily insured brides of
the defendant had also drowned in the bath.
62
Writers have commonly rationalized this doctrine by saying
that the need for an impermissible inference by way of character
or subjective disposition is avoided in such cases because of the
intrinsic improbability that a person would be mistakenly or ac-
cidentally implicated in a later offense where he has previously
been involved in other incidents of the same highly distinctive
character.63 However, common sense propensity inferences can
generally be recast as inferences from a reduced probability of a
person's being innocently implicated in a crime where he has
previously committed similar crimes."
In realistic terms, evidence of similar offenses is admitted in
"common scheme" or "modus operandi" cases because it shows
that the defendant has a propensity to engage in a very specific
type of criminal activity, and invites the inference that the cur-
rently charged offense was a result of that propensity.6 There is
no more than a difference of degree between such cases and the
ordinary situation in which a defendant has a record of offenses
which show less specific or generic similarities to the currently
charged offense. Recognizing the difference as one of degree, it
becomes difficult to justify the current approach under which a
judge draws an arbitrary line at some point along the continuum
of specific similarity between a currently charged offense and
earlier offenses, and excludes earlier offenses falling on one side
of the line as mere propensity evidence, while admitting those
falling on the other side as evidence of a common scheme or mo-
dus operandi. It is not apparent why such evidence should not
be regularly disclosed to the trier, with the degree of specific
similarity between the charged offense and earlier offenses going
to their probative force rather than their admissibility.
62. See supra text accompanying note 17.
63. See generally E. IMWiNKELRiED, supra note 8, §§ 4:01, 5:05; C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, supra note 10, § 5239, at 462-65; Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar
Fact Evidence, 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 284, 289-90.
64. The commission of a crime in itself puts an offender in a class of persons whose
members have a greater than average probability of being responsible for later offenses
of a similar character. For example, it would be quite a coincidence if a person with a
history of muggings just happened to lose a ring at the site of a later mugging, though
not involved in the crime. Or if a person had twice been convicted of rape, it would be a
striking case of bad luck if he just happened to be passing through a neighborhood when
a rape was committed there by another person of similar appearance. Cf. sources cited
supra note 63 (discussing rationale for the "common scheme" exception).
65. See Hoffman, Similar Facts After Boardman, 91 L.Q. REv. 193, 197-98 (1975).
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Examples of arbitrary line-drawing can also readily be sup-
plied in connection with other "exception" categories. For exam-
ple, the existing exception for evidence of skill or criminal abil-
ity6" is generally limited to cases in which prior offenses show
some technical skill or unusual ability.67 In a much broader
range of situations, however, prior offenses have some degree of
relevance on this point. For example, in a prosecution for an un-
armed battery, the prior commission of similar crimes tends to
show that the defendant has the physical capacity and adept-
ness at physical aggression required to commit such an offense,
and in a fraud prosecution the defendant's history as a con artist
tends to show that he has the self-confidence and adeptness at
psychological manipulation of victims which that occupation re-
quires. Here, too, it is unclear why relevant evidence of this sort
should be concealed from the trier unless a judge decides that it
has an extraordinarily high degree of probative value. In the ab-
sence of a special rule limiting prior-crimes evidence, the unusu-
alness or prevalence of the skills or capacities shown by prior
offenses would simply be considered by the trier as factors bear-
ing on their probative value.
3. Incoherence of the Impeachment Rule
Evidence of a defendant's prior convictions is generally inad-
missible, but it becomes admissible with certain limitations
when the defendant takes the stand. For example, Rule 609 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that convictions for of-
fenses involving dishonesty or false statement are admissible
"[flor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness," in-
cluding a testifying defendant, and that felonies of any sort are
admissible for the same purpose if "the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant.""
Impeachment rules like Fed. R. Evid. 609, as they apply to
testifying defendants, are often characterized as providing that
prior convictions are admissible to attack the defendant's credi-
bility but "not as evidence of guilt."69 Taken straightforwardly,
this formulation appears to be self-contradictory. If a defendant
66. See supra text accompanying note 21.
67. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, §§ 4:07, 5:12.
68. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
,69. See Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injus-
tice in the Courtroom, 130 U. P& L. Rav. 845, 868 & n.84 (1982).
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takes the stand, his testimony will amount in one way or another
to a denial of his guilt. If prior convictions are taken as evidence
that he may be lying in making this denial, then they must also
be taken as evidence that he may in fact be guilty.
A better understanding of the impeachment rule is that it
does not bar an ultimate inference of possible guilt from prior
convictions but that it bars a certain type of intermediate infer-
ence in reaching that conclusion. For example, suppose that a
person is prosecuted for breaking into a house and stealing jew-
elry and silverware, and that a prior conviction for theft is ad-
mitted "for impeachment" when he takes the stand and claims
to be innocent. An inference of possible guilt might be drawn
from this evidence by two quite different lines of reasoning:
(1) The defendant previously committed a theft; there-
fore, he may be a generally dishonest person; therefore,
he may now be lying when he denies committing the bur-
glary he is currently charged with; therefore, he may be
guilty of that burglary.
(2) The defendant previously committed a theft; there-
fore, he may lack respect for the property rights of
others; therefore, he may be guilty of the currently
charged burglary.
The impeachment rule apparently permits inference (1), in
which the intermediate steps include an inference that the de-
fendant has a propensity to lie, but not inference (2), in which
the intermediate step is an inference that the defendant has a
character trait which would dispose him to steal or commit other
property offenses.
This understanding of the impeachment rule saves it from be-
ing self-contradictory, but says little for its rationality. It is not
apparent why prior convictions can be admitted when the de-
fendant takes the stand as evidence that he will commit perjury,
but not as evidence of a propensity to commit other types of
crimes. Moreover, the inference by way of a propensity to lie is
likely to be weaker than a direct inference to an enhanced
probability of committing the charged offense from a propensity
to commit such offenses shown by earlier crimes. In the burglary
case described above, for example, inference (2), which proceeds
by way of the defendant's apparent lack of respect for other peo-
ple's property rights, has considerably greater force than infer-
ence (1), which proceeds by way of an inference of general dis-
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989] Admission of Criminal Histories 741
honesty. In such cases the impeachment rule permits relatively
weak inferences but excludes relatively strong ones.
Another criticism of the impeachment rule is the difficulty of
understanding and complying with it. It calls on the trier to dis-
tinguish between permissible and impermissible intermediate in-
ferences running from the same evidence (a prior conviction) to
the same conclusion (an enhanced probability of guilt), and to
refrain from an inference by way of specific propensity while
drawing an inference by way of general credibility, though the
former is likely to be stronger and more natural than the latter.
This difficult psychological trick is supposed to be performed on
the basis of a charge indicating that a prior conviction may be
considered as evidence impugning the credibility of a defen-
dant's denial of his guilt, but not as evidence of his guilt. Not
surprisingly, the view is often expressed that the impeachment
rule's limitation on the purpose for which a defendant's criminal
record is admitted is simply a fiction that does not affect the
actual assessment of such evidence by juries. 0
Other problems with the impeachment rule include the
following:
First, by limiting the admission of prior convictions to cases in
which the defendant takes the stand, the impeachment rule im-
pedes the search for truth by making the decision to testify a
potentially costly one. Whether a defendant is guilty or inno-
cent, he is normally the person who knows the most about the
truth of the charges against him, and it is conducive to the dis-
covery of truth if he is available for questioning at trial. How-
ever, the existing rule which conditions the admission of a de-
fendant's criminal record on his decision to take the stand
provides him with an incentive to refrain from testifying.
Through its tendency to enforce silence on the defendant at
trial, this limitation both impedes the conviction of the guilty
and potentially jeopardizes the innocent. 1
Second, the admissibility of prior convictions under a rule like
Fed. R. Evid. 609 tends to be inversely proportional to their ac-
tual value as evidence of guilt. In general, prior offenses are most
probative of guilt if they are similar in character to a currently
charged offense. For example, the information that a person has
been convicted of making false statements on an income tax re-
70. See id. at 868-69 & n.85; Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instruc-
tions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & Huhi
BEHAV. 37 (1985).
71. See H. KALVEN & H. Zism, supra note 46, at 146 (criminal record correlated with
increased likelihood that defendant will stay off the stand).
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turn is not very helpful in assessing a charge that he has com-
mitted an aggravated battery, but the information that he has a
history of serious assaultive crimes has considerably greater rele-
vance on this point.79 Under Rule 609(a), however, the defend-
ant's conviction for income tax evasion-a crime involving "dis-
honesty or false statement"-would automatically be admissible
to attack the credibility of his testimony.
In comparison, the admission of the defendant's history of as-
saultive crimes in such a case would be problematic in light of
Rule 609's provision that crimes other than crimina falsi are ad-
missible only if the court determines "that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant." Because prior convictions are only admissible under
the rule for their relevance to credibility, the natural inference
from the defendant's assault record-that he has a propensity to
violence-would automatically be regarded as impermissible
"prejudice," and some or all of it could be excluded on that
ground. The point of this example is generally applicable: The
formulation of Rule 609 generally creates the strongest presump-
tion against the admission of prior convictions which are actu-
ally of the greatest relevance in assessing the charge against the
defendant on account of their supposedly "prejudicial" effect.72
4. Complication of Proceedings
A final point against the existing rules is their intrinsic com-
plexity and the volume of litigation they generate. A defendant's
past conduct may be a highly relevant consideration in assessing
the charges against him, but the law has proceeded on the as-
sumption that such evidence must be excluded under a broader
or narrower range of circumstances. The tension between normal
canons of rational judgment and the basic legal rule in this area
has inexorably resulted in the development of a complex body of
exceptions and qualifications which frequently call for contro-
vertible judgments by individual judges concerning the admis-
sion of such evidence, and further litigation on appeal in chal-
lenges to such judgments. As a result, "[tihere is no question of
evidence more frequently litigated in the appellate courts than
72. See generally supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
73. See 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 316, at 329-30 (1977).
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the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. '"7 4 If some im-
portant interest of justice were furthered by restricting the use
of such evidence, this cost would be justified, but it is dubious
that this is the case. The affirmative grounds for considering
such evidence on a regular basis seem quite strong, the reasons
that have traditionally been offered in support of a restrictive
approach seem highly deficient on examination, and the specific
restrictive rules that now apply in this area are in many respects
anomalous.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The text of the Constitution does not, on its face, purport to
limit the use of prior offenses as evidence in criminal cases, and
there is nothing in the history of the Constitution which sug-
gests an intent to give constitutional status to limitations on this
type of evidence. Judicial decisions in the United States have
generally rejected constitutional arguments against the use of
such evidence. Supreme Court decisions and issues that have
been raised in legal writing or inferior court litigation will be
considered separately.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Throughout most of the nation's history, the Supreme Court
had no occasion to address this issue in constitutional terms, but
did rule on the admissibility of prior-crimes evidence in a num-
ber of cases as an evidentiary matter. Thus, in Woods v. United
States, the Court upheld the admission of other fraudulent acts
by an importer to show his intent to evade the duty on imported
goods through fraudulent invoices, finding the relevance of such
evidence to a matter in issue to be a sufficient ground for its
admission.7 5 In Boyd v. United States, the Court found revers-
ible error in the admission of evidence concerning the commis-
74. C. Wm1GHr & K GRAHA, supra note 10, § 5239, at 427; see E IMWINKELRMD,
supra note 8, § 1:04.
75. 41 U.S. 342, 359-61 (1842). In an earlier case, the issue of prior crimes evidence
had arisen tangentially. The defendant had been prosecuted for passing a counterfeit
note, and evidence was admitted that he had passed a second counterfeit note to estab-
lish guilty knowledge. The defendant was acquitted, but was then separately prosecuted
-for passing the second note and convicted. The Court held that this was not double
jeopardy. See United States v. Randenbush, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 288 (1834).
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sion of a number of robberies by the defendants in a prosecution
for a murder that may have been committed in the course of a
subsequent robbery, citing lack of fair notice to the defendants,
potential jury prejudice, and the absence of adequate cautionary
instructions. 6 In contrast, in another murder case, Moore v.
United States," the Court upheld the admission of evidence of
an earlier uncharged murder to show that the victim's awareness
of evidence implicating the defendant in the earlier crime might
have motivated the defendant to kill him. In a bribery prosecu-
tion in 1948, Michelson v. United States,78 the Court found no
error in the prosecutor's asking the defendant's character wit-
nesses whether they had heard that the defendant had been ar-
rested for receiving stolen property twenty-seven years earlier.
In a 1949 prosecution for defrauding the government by filing
false invoices, Nye & Nissen v. United States, the Court held
that evidence of the filing of other false invoices, not charged in
the indictment, was admissible to show intent. 9 In a drug traf-
ficking prosecution in 1954, Walder v. United States,80 the
Court upheld the admission of evidence of an earlier unrelated
offense of drug possession to impeach the defendant's credibil-
ity, in light of his specific assertion on the stand that he had
never possessed narcotics.
These cases show that the Supreme Court has usually upheld
the admission of prior-crimes evidence as an evidentiary matter
when presented with the question. However, the decisions in
these cases turned on ad hoc applications of conventional rules
and rationales relating to such evidence, and involved no inde-
pendent doctrinal development by the Court.
The first constitutional decision was Lisenba v. California,"
in which the defendant was prosecuted for drowning his recently
married wife to collect accident insurance. Evidence was admit-
ted which tended to show that the defendant had drowned a for-
mer wife for the same purpose, under the conventional eviden-
tiary principle that "similar but disconnected acts may be shown
to establish intent, design, and system."82 The Supreme Court
held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free
76. 142 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1892).
77. 150 U.S. 57 (1893).
78. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
79. 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949).
80. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
81. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
82. Id. at 223-25, 227.
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to adopt a rule of relevance" under which the evidence was
properly admitted.8"
The second constitutional case was Ciucci v. Illinois.84 The
case involved a defendant who was charged in four separate in-
dictments with murdering his wife and three children, all of
whom were found dead in a burning building with bullet wounds
in their heads. The defendant was found guilty of murder in
three separate trials, in each of which evidence was admitted
concerning all four deaths. The Supreme Court rejected a due
process challenge to the third conviction in a per curiam opin-
ion, holding that the relevance of the entire occurrence in each
of the prosecutions was sufficient to make the admission of this
evidence constitutionally permissible.
The third constitutional case was Spencer v. Texas,88 which
involved Texas recidivist statutes under which the defendant's
prior convictions were specified in the indictment and evidence
of those convictions was admitted at trial. The jury, though
aware of the defendant's earlier convictions during the trial, was
instructed to take them as relevant only to sentencing, and not
to consider them in deciding on the defendant's guilt or
innocence.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this proce-
dure against a due process challenge, noting that it reflected a
common, conventional approach to recidivist sentencing. In the
course of the opinion, the Court also noted that evidence of
prior offenses was conventionally admissible for various other
purposes,86 expressed some skepticism concerning the suppos-
edly prejudicial effect of such evidence, 87 and rejected the argu-
ment that the Texas procedure's validity was impugned by the
possibility of other recidivist procedures under which prior con-
victions would be withheld from the jury during the guilt-deter-
mination phase of trial.88
The most recent constitutional decision was Marshall v.
Lonberger,8 in which the Court upheld the admission of a prior
conviction under an Ohio "aggravated murder" procedure that
was similar in its operation to the recidivist statutes considered
in Spencer v. Texas. In responding to a dissenting argument
83. Id. at 227-28.
84. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
.85. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
86. Id. at 560-62.
87. Id. at 565 & n.8.
88. Id. at 565-69.
89. 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
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that Spencer v. Texas should be overruled, the Court explicitly
reaffirmed its validity, pointed out that prior-crimes evidence
had traditionally been admitted in various circumstances, and
downplayed the supposed risk of prejudice that such evidence
presents:
[The] dissent appears to rest on a view that the common
law regarded the admission of prior convictions as grossly
unfair and subject to some sort of blanket prohibition. In
fact, the common law was far more ambivalent ....
Alongside the general principle that convictions are inad-
missible, despite their relevance to guilt ... the common
law developed broad, vaguely defined exceptions-such
as proof of intent, identity, malice, motive, and
plan-whose application is left largely to the discretion
of the trial judge . . . . In short, the common law, like
our decision in Spencer, implicitly recognized that any
unfairness resulting from admitting prior convictions was
more often than not balanced by its probative value and
permitted the prosecution to introduce such evidence
without demanding any particularly strong justification."0
Beyond these four decisions-Lisenba v. California, Ciucci v.
Illinois, Spencer v. Texas, and Marshall v. Lonberger-the only
decisions of the Court directly relevant to this issue are those
relating to reliance on prior convictions that are later deter-
mined to be constitutionally invalid. For example, in Burgett v.
Texas," the Court overturned a conviction where a prior convic-
tion obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel was admitted at trial as relevant for penalty-
enhancement, and in Loper v. Beto,e" the same result was
reached where prior convictions invalid on sixth amendment
grounds were admitted to impeach the defendant's credibility.
These decisions and others like them depend essentially on the
invalidity of the prior conviction, and have no implications in
other contexts.'8
In sum, the Supreme Court's decisions support the proposi-
tion that a valid prior conviction can constitutionally be admit-
90. Id. at 438 n.6.
91. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
92. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
93. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 438-39 n.6, 449-53 (rejecting dissenting
argument that Spencer v. Texas should be overruled in light of subsequent decision re-
lating to invalid convictions); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 115-16 (distinguishing Spen-
cer v. Texas).
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ted if it is relevant in the determination of guilt or innocence
(Lisenba v. California, Ciucci v. Illinois), or if there is some
other reason for admitting it (Spencer v. Texas, Marshall v.
Lonberger). The general attitude of the Court toward the admis-
sion of such evidence can only be described as casual. The Court
has been skeptical of the supposed potential for prejudice in ad-
mitting such evidence and has not required the state to show
any strong justification for permitting it to be used.
B. Arguments And Issues
Legal writers and litigants in the lower courts have advanced
various constitutional arguments against admitting prior-crimes
evidence. None of these arguments, however, provide any con-
vincing basis for imposing special restrictions on the use of this
type of evidence. Specific arguments that have been raised in-
clude the following:
1. Fair Notice under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
The sixth amendment provides that in a criminal prosecution
"the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation." The due process clause of the
fifth amendment is also understood to include a requirement of
fair notice of charges. The admission of evidence of offenses that
are not charged in the indictment or information has been criti-
cized as violating these provisions."
There is, however, no reason to believe that these provisions
were meant to require notice of anything other than the charge
for which the defendant is being tried. There is nothing in the
history of the Bill of Rights which suggests that notice was to be
required in relation to uncharged offenses admitted for their evi-
dentiary value.95 The same understanding is supported by the
historical practice of admitting evidence of uncharged offenses
under various circumstances." Congress did not accept the sug-
94. See Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. Rsv. 113, 163-69 (1984).
95. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452, 948 (1789); 2 HL STORING, THE CoMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 262 (1981); 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 328, 334; 3 id. 467, 658; 4 id. 243.
96. See 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 22, § 369, at 375 & nn. 1-3 (historical admissibility
of uncharged acts as evidence in treason cases); Reed, supra note 6, at 718-19 (catalogue
of grounds for admitting uncharged crimes evidence recognized in the late eighteenth
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gestion that pretrial notice of intent to offer evidence of un-
charged offenses be required in its consideration of Rule 404(b)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and most states continue to
adhere to the same position. 7
As noted in the earlier discussion of fair notice as a policy con-
sideration, this type of argument could at most support a re-
quirement of procedural safeguards-pretrial notice of intent to
offer evidence of uncharged offenses in certain circum-
stances-and does not otherwise logically support limiting the
use of such evidence. Moreover, "fair notice" considerations,
whether framed as policy arguments or constitutional argu-
ments, have no bearing at all on the admission of prior convic-
tions as opposed to evidence of unproven offenses. In relation to
the sixth amendment requirement of notice of the nature and
cause of "the accusation," a prior conviction is not an "accusa-
tion" to which the defendant may present a defense, but is ad-
mitted as a record of an adjudication of guilt on an earlier
charge that the defendant is not free to controvert. In relation to
the fifth amendment due process requirement of "fair notice,"
there is no unfairness in failing to provide defendants with case-
by-case pretrial notice of intent to offer prior convictions."8
2. The Due Process Right to a Fair Trial
It has been argued that the admission of evidence of prior of-
fenses is so inherently prejudicial that it violates the general
right to a fair trial implicit in the requirement of due process.
Variant formulations of this argument have asserted that the
prejudicial character of such evidence undermines or violates
more specific "due process" rights, such as the presumption of
innocence.99
and early nineteenth centuries); Stone, supra note 5, at 958, 960 (historical admissibility
of uncharged acts as evidence in treason cases); supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
97. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, §§ 9:09, 10:14; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 10, § 5249, at 525.
98. See United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 149 (7th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment
right to notice of the accusation does not limit evidentiary rule admitting "other crimes"
evidence); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (pretrial notice
requirement for evidence of other offenses does not apply to convictions); MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 7.02 (pretrial notice requirement does not apply to offenses for which defendant has
previously been prosecuted); E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, §§ 9:09, 10:14; supra text
accompanying notes 32-37.
99. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572-75 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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However formulated, the "fair trial" arguments all rest on the
unsupported empirical assumption that prior-crimes evidence is
likely to result in unjustified convictions based on antagonism or
to be taken by the trier for more than it is rationally worth. Be-
cause there is no reason to believe that this is the case,100 there
is no basis for implying special constitutional restrictions on the
use of such evidence based on concerns over prejudice.101
3. The Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The admission of evidence of prior offenses has been attacked
as inconsistent with the requirement of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, because the evidence offered to establish such an of-
fense may fall short of that standard of proof. However, the. rea-
sonable doubt standard only requires that the totality of
evidence admitted in a case establish the defendant's guilt of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any particular evidentiary
fact, including the commission of a prior offense which is admit-
ted for its evidentiary value.0 2
Like most other constitutional and policy arguments against
admitting evidence of prior offenses, this argument has no possi-
ble application to the admission of prior convictions, as opposed
to evidence of unproven offenses. The defendant's commission of
the offense underlying such a conviction has already been estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant
through a guilty plea.
4. The Right against Self-Incrimination
It has been argued that the admission of prior-crimes evidence
violates the fifth amendment right against compelled self-in-
crimination because it puts pressure on the defendant to take
the stand in order to respond to that evidence.103 This argument
100. See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
101. Cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (no due process violation in admitting
details of uncharged murders in repeated prosecutions arising from same incident).
102. See Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1974); E. IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 8, §§ 10:11, 10:13.
103. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5239, at 438; Note, Evidence:
Prior Crimes Used to Show Specific Intent and Identity, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 133, 139-40
.(1966).
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is specious because the offer of any type of evidence by the pros-
ecution can put pressure on the defendant to take the stand in
order to rebut it. There is no judicial support for this
argument.'0 4
IV. THE LAW OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
An examination of foreign law shows no general view among
the legal systems of democratic nations that evidence of a de-
fendant's convictions should be restricted at all, much less that
it should be restricted in conformity with the principles that
now govern the use of such evidence in the United States. In
contrast to American law's current preoccupation with the pur-
pose for which prior-crimes evidence is offered-evidence of pro-
pensity versus other purposes-English law now regards the pro-
bative value of such evidence as the touchstone of admissibility.
In many European democracies-including those which use lay
jurors or juries-a defendant's criminal history is uniformly ad-
missible in evidence.
A. England
Until 1974, the rule on prior-crimes evidence in England was
the same as the "inclusionary" version of the rule in the United
States: Evidence of uncharged offenses could not be admitted to
show the defendant's propensity to criminal conduct, but if it
was relevant for some purpose-e.g., to show intent, modus
operandi, etc.-it could be admitted.
This approach was abrogated by the decision of D.P.P. v.
Boardman,"' in which the House of Lords effectively recognized'
that the distinction between propensity and non-propensity uses
of prior-crimes evidence was not consistent with the actual
course of judicial decisions and did not provide a rational crite-
The sources cited supra argue more specifically that the admission of prior crimes
evidence is objectionable on fifth amendment grounds because if the defendant takes the
stand and only responds to the prior-crimes evidence, adverse inferences may be drawn
from his failure to respond to the other evidence of his guilt on the charged offense.
However, they do not attempt to explain how this distinguishes prior-crimes evidence
from any other type of evidence. Whenever the defendant takes the stand and responds
to some but not all of the evidence against him, inferences may be drawn that he cannot
respond to the remainder.
104. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 10:19.
105. [1975] App. Cas. 421.
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rion of admissibility. Boardman has been understood as estab-
lishing the probative value of such evidence as the criterion of
admissibility, regardless of whether the inference of guilt from
prior offenses proceeds by way of an intermediate inference of
criminal propensity or by some other route. It is unclear how
great the probative value of such evidence must be to support its
admission. However, one of the participants in the House of
Lords debate in Boardman suggested that the standard should
be whether the evidence, taken together with the other evidence
in the case, points "so strongly to . . . guilt that only an ultra-
cautious jury, if they accepted it as true, would acquit in [the]
face of it.' '1"e
Beyond the general case law rule of admissibility described
above, there are some special statutory rules that authorize the
admission of a testifying defendant's criminal record. This is
permitted if the defense has (i) introduced evidence of the de-
fendant's good character, (ii) made imputations against the
character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses, or (iii)
given evidence against a co-defendant. 1°0
B. European Systems
The legal systems of the European democracies do not start
from a conventional presumption against the admission of evi-
dence of other offenses committed by a defendant. In many of
them, the defendant's criminal record is routinely admitted. In
France, for example, "the history of the accused, including his
criminal record, is read out at the beginning of the trial."10' 8
The differing presumptions of the common law tradition and
European practice on this point have sometimes been explained
by reference to the common law's reliance on trial by jury, and a
supposed likelihood that jurors will be prejudiced against the
defendant by such evidence. However, the actual institutional
arrangements of criminal adjudication in the European systems
106. See Elliott, supra note 63; Hoffman, supra note 65.
107. See generally J. BUZZARD, R MAY, & M. HowARD, PHnPSON ON EVIDENCE 221-27,
app. at 921 (12th ed. 1976); G. WuLLIASs, supra note 31, at 216-26.
108. Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report-Evidence (General), 1972,
Cmnd. 4991, at 49; see 1A J. Wigmore, supra note 5, § 58.1, at 1212 & n.3; R DAVM & H.
DE VRS, THE FRENCH LEGAL SysrMm 88-89 (1957); C. WmGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note
10, § 5232, at 346-47; see also Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for
-Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BumALo L. Rav. 361, 380 (1977). But cf. Damaska,
supra note 33, at 518-19 (restrictive interpretation of significance accorded to prior con-
victions in European systems).
SPRUNG AND SUMMER 1989]
Journal of Law Reform
do not support this distinction. In most European countries seri-
ous criminal cases are tried before mixed tribunals which in-
clude "lay judges" or jurors as well as professional judges. There
are also some European countries that use juries as fact-finding
bodies separate from the court in the same way as common law
jurisdictions. 10'
The free admission of prior convictions in European systems
has been upheld in a quasi-constitutional context. Most of the
European democracies subscribe to the European Convention on
Human Rights. The European Commission on Human Rights is
a court-like entity responsible for enforcing the Convention. Ar-
ticle 6 of the Convention enumerates various procedural rights
of criminal defendants, including provisions that "everyone is
entitled to a fair .. .hearing" and "[elveryone charged with a
criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty."110
In 1965, a Danish prisoner challenged the admission of his
criminal record at trial as violative of the "fair hearing" and
"presumption of innocence" provisions of Article 6. The Com-
mission rejected this claim as "manifestly ill-founded":
The Applicant was charged .. .with rape committed
on two occasions in 1963, and, according to the procedure
applicable, a jury was set up to determine the question of
his guilt.
* * . [T]he Applicant's counsel requested that an ac-
count of the Applicant's previous convictions should not
be given. . . until the jury had reached its decision as to
his guilt in the present case. This request was rejected by
the Court which. . . referred to. . .the Code of Proce-
dure . . . which expressly provides that records of previ-
ous convictions may be used as evidence ....
Following this decision. . . the Public Prosecutor gave
an account of the Applicant's numerous previous convic-
tions; in particular, on one occasion in 1956, he had al-
ready been convicted of rape, and sentenced to six years'
imprisonment ....
...[T]he jury found that the Applicant was guilty of
the offenses charged ....
109. See G. GLOS, COMPARATVE LAW 19-20, 135-36, 301-02, 437-38, 693, 703-06 (1979);
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 13-14 n.3.
110. See C. MORRISON, THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17-32, 216-
17, 218-20 (1967).
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The Applicant now complains ... that the Public
Prosecutor was allowed to inform the jury of his previous
convictions, not only in general terms but in considerable
detail. . . . [H]e. .. requests a new trial before an un-
biased jury ....
. . . [Wihen interpreting such fundamental concepts as
"fair hearing" . . . and "presumption of innocence"...
the Commission finds it necessary to take into account
the practice in different countries which are members of
the Council of Europe. . . . [I]t is clear that in a number
of these countries information as to previous convictions
is regularly given during the trial .... [T]he Commis-
sion is not prepared to consider such a procedure as vio-
lating. . . the Convention, not even in cases where a jury
is to decide on the guilt of an accused.11'
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
A. A Uniform Rule Of Admission For Prior Convictions
In sum, limitations on the admission of evidence of uncharged
,offenses initially arose in the late seventeenth century as a re-
sponse to concerns over fair notice to defendants. Throughout
history, however, the rules limiting such evidence have been sub-
ject to a variety of qualifications and exceptions.
The persistence of extensive restrictions on prior-crimes evi-
dence in criminal trials is in conflict with the practice of consid-
ering all relevant evidence in assessing the plausibility of charges
of misconduct against a person in non-judicial contexts and with
the free use of propensity evidence in pretrial and posttrial proI-
ceedings in criminal cases. The specific rules that now restrict
the admission of such evidence are haphazard and untenable.
There is no reasonto believe that there is any particular consti-
tutional constraint on modifying these rules or repealing them.
The policy arguments and constitutional arguments support-
ing the exclusion of prior-crimes evidence are particularly insub-
stantial where that evidence is in the form of a prior conviction
for an offense. Two of the traditional grounds for limiting such
evidence-concern over fair notice to defendants and concern
111. X v. Denmark, Application No. 2518/65 (Dec. 14, 1965), reprinted in Y.B. Euin
CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 370-72 (1965).
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over maintaining reasonable limits on the scope of inquiry at
trial-do not apply at all in connection with convictions. The
third traditional rationale-the supposedly prejudicial character
of evidence of prior offenses-is contradicted by the regular
practice of relying on a defendant's criminal history as evidence
of criminal propensity in pretrial and posttrial proceedings and
by the practice of many foreign jurisdictions in regularly admit-
ting criminal histories at trial, including jurisdictions that use
lay jurors or juries in criminal cases. There is no affirmative evi-
dence supporting the assumptions of the "prejudice" rationale
that would overcome the normal presumption in favor of admit-
ting all relevant evidence of guilt.
A final problem with the existing system is that it is highly
productive of litigation. The complex and amorphous rules that
now govern the use of evidence of prior offenses are as fertile a
source of litigated determinations as any issue in the law of
evidence.
In considering the implications of this analysis for the future
development of the law, there are four basic issues to be
addressed:
First, there is the question whether any proposal we might ad-
vance should be limited to the strongest case-the admission of
convictions-or should also propose broader rules of admissibil-
ity for evidence of unproven offenses and other bad acts. On this
point we believe that it would be preferable to limit an initial
reform proposal to broadening the circumstances in which con-
victions are admitted.
Second, there is the question whether we should propose a
uniform rule of admission for prior convictions or a more limited
expansion of the conditions of admission. On this point we be-
lieve that the Department should support a uniform rule of ad-
mission for the criminal records of defendants and other persons
whose conduct or credibility are at issue in a case.
Third, there is the question whether a reform proposal should
only require disclosure of the fact that the defendant has previ-
ous convictions for certain offenses, or should also require or au-
thorize the admission of evidence concerning specific features of
earlier offenses or proceedings resulting in conviction that affect
their probative value in relation to a currently charged offense.
On this point we believe that it would be preferable in an initial
reform proposal to require only disclosure of the basic record of
convictions.
Fourth, we will consider the various forums in which a propo-
sal of this sort might be advanced.
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1. Offenses Established by Convictions versus Other
Misconduct
As noted above, the fair notice and scope-of-inquiry rationales
that have traditionally supported rules excluding evidence of un-
charged misconduct are essentially inapplicable to the admission
of convictions." In relation to evidence of uncharged acts that
have not been established by convictions, however, the policy
considerations differ significantly. While the fair notice and
scope-of-inquiry rationales do not specifically support the par-
ticular approach taken by current law to limiting such evi-
dence-excluding it as evidence of propensity but admitting it
where relevant for other purposes-broader rules of admissibil-
ity would necessarily accentuate the concerns that these ratio-
nales reflect. Proposed reforms applicable to uncharged miscon-
duct generally would be exposed to more substantial criticisms
based on the need to ensure that defendants have a reasonable
opportunity to prepare their defenses, and the need to maintain
reasonable limits on the scope of inquiry at trial. Criticisms of
this sort might be met by including in such proposals broadened
requirements of pretrial notice of intent to offer evidence of un-
charged misconduct and alternative rules limiting the scope of
inquiry in criminal trials. However, the formulation of such al-
ternatives would raise difficult policy questions in its own right.
A second difference between offenses established by convic-
tions and other acts concerns the relationship between the stan-
dards for admitting the criminal histories of defendants and
those of other persons. Under existing law, the restrictions on
admitting evidence of prior convictions for persons other than
defendants are, as a practical matter, relatively slight, and there
would be no obvious harm in eliminating them.113 Thus, a gen-
eral rule of admissibility for conviction records, applicable to
other persons as well as defendants, is an attractive option that
would be immune from criticism as singling out defendants for
unfavorable treatment.
In comparison, the existing rules on admitting evidence of
prior acts by victims and non-defendant witnesses-other than
offenses established by convictions-are more restrictive, and
the problems entailed by relaxing them would be more substan-
tial. For example, most American jurisdictions-including the
112. See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
113. The conviction records of victims and other non-defendant witnesses generally
become admissible when they take the stand. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
Journal of Law Reform
federal jurisdiction in Fed. R. Evid. 412-have recently enacted
amendments limiting the admission of a rape victim's history of
unrelated sexual activity for the purpose of bolstering a defense
of consent. " While the policy considerations affecting the ad-
mission of a defendant's personal history can differ significantly
from those affecting the admission of prior acts of victims and
other persons involved in a case, '15 a reform proposal that ap-
plied more liberal rules of admission against defendants would
predictably be attacked as unfair to defendants and carry a
heavier persuasive burden than an evenhanded rule. The alter-
native possibility would be to propose making prior acts of vic-
tims and other witnesses more broadly admissible on an even-
handed basis with defendants. However, changes of that sort
would be in conflict with the trend of recent legal developments
in the area of rape prosecutions, and would generally be subject
to criticism as bolstering the efforts of defense counsel to divert
proceedings from trials of the charges against the defendant into
trials of the character of victims and other prosecution
witnesses.
A final advantage of a broadened admission rule limited to
convictions is that it would involve a more limited departure
from existing law. Under the traditional rules of evidence, the
conviction records of witnesses in criminal cases, including testi-
fying defendants, have been broadly admissible for purposes of
impeachment. A version of this traditional rule appears in the
Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule 609. A reform proposal lim-
ited in its application to convictions could naturally be cast as
an amendment to, or comparable substitute for, this existing
rule, rather than as a wholly novel evidentiary principle. A draft
amendment of this sort to the Rules of Evidence, and an ana-
lytic statement containing more specific support for the particu-
lar approach we recommend, appears in the final portion of this
Report. '1 6
In sum, we think that the appropriate starting point for re-
form efforts in this area would be a rule broadening the admissi-
bility of convictions. The adoption of such a rule could, of
114. See generally S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 13, at 220-28; C. WIGHT &
K. GRAHAM. supra note 10, at § 5238.
115. For example, rape victim shield laws reflect in part the concern that rape victims
will be less willing to report offenses or cooperate in prosecution if doing so exposes them
to public fishing expeditions into their sexual histories. The same consideration does not
apply to the defendant, since his cooperation is not required for carrying out the prose-
cution. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 10:31.
116. See infra Part V.B.
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course, strengthen the case for other reforms we might ulti-
mately wish to propose in relation to the admission of other
types of uncharged misconduct evidence.
2. A Uniform Rule of Admission for Conviction Records
Under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is
not admissible unless it is relevant. Rule 403 states a general
rule that even relevant evidence can be excluded if the trial
judge believes that its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by its potential for causing prejudice, confusing the is-
sues, or wasting time. Other rules impose pre-conditions on the
admission of specific types of evidence based on estimations con-
cerning their probative value and potentially prejudicial effect,
including Rule 609(a)'s provision that offenses other than
crimina falsi are admissible for purposes of impeachment only if
their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect to the
defendant.
If the existing rule against admitting criminal histories as evi-
dence of character or propensity were repealed, the question
would remain whether the admission of a conviction should be
conditioned on a determination by the trial judge that it has
some probative value or that its probative value is not out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect or other adverse consequences
of admitting it. On this point we believe that a uniform rule of
admission would be preferable. In other words, the criminal
records of defendants and other persons whose conduct or credi-
bility are at issue in a case should always be admissible. The
reasons for not conditioning the admission of such evidence on
determinations relating to efficiency and the reasons for not con-
ditioning its admission on determinations relating to potential
prejudice merit separate discussion.
a. Efficiency- Rule 402 states a general rule that evidence
must be relevant to be admissible-in other words, it must have
some probative value. Rule 403 states in part that even relevant
evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by considerations of "undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
The evident purpose of these provisions is to bar evidence of
no probative value or relatively insubstantial probative value in
order to prevent proceedings from being pointlessly complicated
or prolonged. However, this policy would not be advanced by
applying the standards of these rules to the admission of crimi-
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nal records. Rather, in comparison with the simple expedient of
admitting such records routinely, it is the approach of condition-
ing their use on particularized judicial determinations concern-
ing probative value and other factors that carries the larger po-
tential for prolonging proceedings and wasting time.117
The uniform rule of admission that we favor would predict-
ably be criticized as authorizing the admission of convictions
that are too remote in character and time from the charged of-
fense to have any real bearing on the proceedings. For example,
in a prosecution for securities fraud, an isolated thirty-year-old
conviction for driving while intoxicated could be admitted,
though doing so would not be of any real value to the trier in
deciding on the truth or falsity of the current charge. Three
points may be noted in response to this objection:
First, while it is true that a prior conviction would lack signifi-
cant probative value in such a case, it is equally true that its
admission would be harmless. Remoteness in time and character
that would tend to deprive a prior conviction of probative value
in relation to a charged offense would also tend to eliminate any
possibility that its admission would affect the verdict. Given the
indifference of the question of admission or exclusion in* such a
case to the likelihood of an accurate verdict, the advantage of a
simple, uniform rule that minimizes the possibility of litigation
over questions of admission can properly be given controlling
effect.1"8
Second, the admission of convictions in comparable circum-
stances is quite possible under the conventional rules of evi-
dence. Under the traditional impeachment rule, for exanple, the
felony and crimen falsi convictions of witnesses, including testi-
fying defendants, were not subject to particularized determina-
tioris of relevance, but were admitted routinely with no require-
ment of similarity to the charged offense or time limitation.11 9
117. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
118. Of course the prosecutor might consider it prudent not to offer evidence of such
a remote conviction, since it might be perceived as taxing the defendant unfairly with
ancient or intrinsically irrelevant misconduct, as a tacit concession that the direct evi-
dence of guilt is weak, or as an indication that the defendant has not committed other
crimes of greater relevance to the charged offense. See State v. Farmer, 24 A. 985, 986
(Me. 1892); 120 CONG. Rac. 37,081 (1974) (remarks of Senator McClellan); Note, supra
note 42, at 544 & n.66. In furthering the objective of convicting the guilty, such judg-
ments are best left to the strategic assessment of prosecutors in particular cases. For the
reasons noted in the accompanying textual discussion, no legitimate interest of defend-
ants would be impaired by doing so, and a contrary rule would carry substantial costs.
119. See FED. R. EvD. 609(b), Advisory Committee's Note; Ladd, Credibility
Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. Rav. 166, 176-77 (1940); Note, Procedural Protec-
tions of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
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Finally, it may be noted that relevance to the determination
of guilt or innocence is not the only permissible ground for ad-
mitting criminal records at trial. Rather, it is sufficient in consti-
tutional terms if some legitimate purpose is furthered by their
admission.1 20 An unqualified rule of admission for criminal
records would further the legitimate state interest of promoting
efficiency, consistency, and predictability in criminal prosecu-
tions, even though it could occasionally result in the admission
of convictions too remote to be relevant to the pending charge.
b. Prejudice- Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by "the danger of unfair
prejudice.' 2' Rule 609 provides more specifically that a defend-
ant's convictions for crimes other than crimina falsi are admissi-
ble for impeachment only if their probative value outweighs
their prejudicial effect to the defendant. In contrast, judges have
no discretion to exclude any witness's convictions for crimina
falsi based on estimations of potential prejudice, and judges also
cannot exclude convictions of other crimes based on estimations
of prejudice to non-defendant witnesses. 1 2  The rule we recom-
mend would apply the latter approach uniformly: Trial courts
would have no discretion to exclude any prior convictions of de-
fendants, as well as those of other persons involved in a case,
based on perceived risks of prejudice.
We see no substantial objections to this approach. There is no
reason to believe that admitting conviction records routinely at
nation and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 426, 441 (1964). Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) has departed from the traditional
rule by imposing a general ten-year time limit on prior convictions, but this limitation is
unsound for reasons discussed infra at text accompanying notes 141-43.
120. See Jervis v. Hall, 622 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1980) (interpreting Supreme Court's
decision in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), as upholding constitutionality of ad-
mitting prior crimes evidence whenever any legitimate state interest, such as judicial
economy, is served by admission); supra text accompanying notes 85-90 (discussion of
decisions in Spencer and Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983), in which the ad-
mission of convictions in the guilt-determination phase of trial was upheld, despite their
irrelevance under state law to the determination of guilt or innocence).
121. Rule 403 also authorizes balancing against the risks of "confusion of the issues"
and "misleading the jury." To the extent that these terms are specifications of the notion
of "prejudice," they are addressed in the accompanying textual discussion. To the extent
that they refer to the somewhat different concern over the possibility of general confu-
sion or distraction resulting from the introduction of a large volume of marginally rele-
vant evidentiary material, they are not implicated by a rule whose effect is limited to
admitting records of convictions. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. See gener-
ally C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5215, at 273-74, §§ 5216-17.
122. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7102-03 (confer-
ence committee report); 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (House floor consideration of final
version of rules).
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trial would carry any greater potential for unfairness than the
contemporary American practice of admitting such records rou-
tinely in sentencing proceedings, or the practice of various Euro-
pean legal systems in admitting such records as a matter of
course at trial. " '
Conversely, authorizing the exclusion of such evidence based
on case-by-case balancing of probative value and supposed dan-
gers of prejudice would carry substantial costs. The admission of
conviction records would continue to be a litigable issue whose
resolution would frequently be unpredictable, given the specula-
tive nature of any particular judge's assessment of the likelihood
that a jury will be "prejudiced" by such evidence, and the large
subjective element involved in "balancing" such a perceived risk
against probative value. The general effect would be to perpetu-
ate the subjectivity and arbitrary line-drawing that characterizes
the application of the existing rules in this area,""4 and the per-
petuation of this issue as a major source of litigation that makes
no demonstrable contribution to the fairness of proceedings.
Moreover, conditioning the admission of conviction records on
an amorphous prejudice-versus-probative-value standard would
threaten the proposal's basic objective of allowing the most im-
portant evidence of a defendant's character and dispositions to
be considered and accorded its natural probative force on a reg-
ular basis. Even in areas in which the existing exceptions to the
rule excluding prior-crimes evidence may apply, judicial opin-
ions often reflect the groundless conviction that this type of evi-
dence carries an extraordinary potential for prejudice and must
be 'approached with caution. 2 ' Entrusting judges whose atti-
tudes have been formed by the existing, restrictive rules to im-
plement a fundamentally different approach under an essen-
tially discretionary standard would tend to undermine the basic
objective of the proposed reform. It would predictably result in
the exclusion of relevant prior-crimes evidence in many cases
based solely on the prejudice of particular judges that juries can-
not be relied on to assess this type of evidence fairly.
123. See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-60, 105-11.
124. See generally supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (ist Cir. 1982); United States
v. Lucero, 601 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 1979).
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3. Other Evidence Concerning Offenses and Proceedings
Resulting in Conviction
If a person is prosecuted for rape and raises a defense of con-
sent, disclosure of the fact that he has two prior convictions for
rape would tend to support an inference that the defense is a
fabrication. This inference would be strengthened if it were also
shown that the defendant had unsuccessfully advanced similarly
stated claims of consent in the earlier prosecutions, or that there
were specific similarities between his behavior in committing the
earlier offenses and the victim's account of his behavior in the
current prosecution. In formulating a general rule of admission
for prior convictions, there is a need to consider whether the in-
formation subject to disclosure should be limited to the fact that
the defendant has previous convictions for certain offenses, or
should also include evidence concerning particular features of
earlier proceedings or offenses resulting in conviction which en-
hance their probative value in relation to the currently charged
offense.
Under current law, the admissible information concerning a
conviction brought in for impeachment pursuant to Rule 609 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence includes the fact that the convic-
tion occurred, the time when it occurred, and the nature of the
offense on which it was based. Some authorities state that the
punishment imposed pursuant to the conviction and the place
where the conviction occurred can also regularly be disclosed.
Beyond these basic facts, eliciting or offering more detailed in-
formation concerning offenses that underlie convictions admit-
ted pursuant to Rule 609 is generally not allowed. 2 '
In terms of policy, the objections to admitting evidence con-
cerning the details of earlier offenses which resulted in convic-
tions are not as strong as the objections that might be raised to
126. See, e.g., Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Boyce, 611 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d
1376, 1381-82 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 87-91 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1970). But see United States v. Bogers, 635 F.2d 749,
751 (8th Cir. 1980) (suggesting more flexible approach to admission of specific facts con-
cerning earlier offenses established by conviction, considering probative value and poten-
tial prejudice).
If the defendant attempts to deny or explain away his guilt of an earlier offense estab-
lished by conviction, the prosecution may be allowed to rejoin by bringing out specific
facts on cross-examination which rebut the denial. See United States v. Wolfe, 561 F.2d
1376, 1381-82 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir.
1970).
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broad rules of admission applicable to uncharged misconduct
generally. Allowing specific facts to be brought out in the prior
convictions situation would not subject a defendant to an open-
ended inquiry into an unforeseeable range of acts of misconduct
extending over the whole course of his life, but would only per-
mit inquiry into the facts of the particular offenses for which he
has been prosecuted and convicted. Because the records of ear-
lier proceedings generally contain information concerning spe-
cific occurrences in those offenses, 27 the need to take new evi-
dence in this context would be less than in connection with
uncharged offenses for which a defendant has never been
prosecuted.
The admission of evidence concerning specific features of ear-
lier offenses established by conviction does, however, raise other
policy questions and potential problems. Because a guilty ver-
dict does not necessarily resolve questions concerning the spe-
cific manner in which an offense was committed, the admission
of evidence on this point carries a greater potential for litigation
than admission of the fact of conviction. Because an unrestricted
rule of admission for evidence concerning the details of earlier
offenses established by convictions would be unwieldy and un-
workable, some exercise of discretion and judgment by the trial
court would be required in deciding on what evidence of this
sort to admit. In formulating standards for such exercises of dis-
cretion, there would be a need to consider whether evidence on
this point should be limited to admissions elicited from the de-
fendant in cross-examination and pertinent excerpts from the
records of earlier proceedings, or whether specific occurrences in
the commission of earlier offenses should be subject to proof or
disproof by extrinsic evidence. Even if taking new evidence were
prohibited, the possibility of questioning and argumentation
concerning the character and import of specific occurrences in
earlier offenses, and the introduction of transcripts of earlier
proceedings, would carry a larger potential for prolonginig trials
and shifting their focus than a rule limited to requiring the ad-
mission of convictions.
On balance, we think that it would be preferable to follow the
approach of current Rule 609 in any initial reform proposal we
might advance, requiring only that conviction records be admit-
127. Relevant records would include the transcripts of earlier trials, offers of proof
and colloquys in guilty plea acceptance proceedings, and findings of fact by the judge in
bench trials. See generally FED. R. CrIM. P. 11(f)-(g) (judge to determine that there is a
factual basis for a guilty plea); FED. R. CrIM. P. 23(c) (judge in bench trial to make find-
ings of fact on request).
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ted. Sufficiently specific similarities between earlier offenses and
the currently charged offense would continue to be admissible in
any event under the existing exception for evidence of a "com-
mon scheme" or "modus operandi."' 2 8 Moreover, the existing re-
strictive approach under Rule 609 to admitting specific informa-
tion concerning offenses established by convictions is premised
in part on the assumption that prior-crimes evidence is highly
prejudicial and can only properly be considered for its bearing
on credibility.""9 The courts accordingly might be amenable to
some relaxation of this approach under a new rule which rejects
the prejudice assumption and reflects an overt legislative judg-
ment that prior offenses established by convictions should be ac-
corded their natural probative force. While reliance on these
somewhat uncertain alternative avenues of admission may be
less than optimal, a reform proposal that only mandates disclos-
ure of the basic record of earlier convictions seems preferable as
a means of staying as close as possible to current law and mini-
mizing potential objections.
4. Means of Advancing the Proposal
A proposal to make criminal histories uniformly admissible at
trial might be advanced in three forums:
First, under 28 U.S.C. § 2076, the Supreme Court has author-
ity to promulgate amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."O5 We could accordingly forward a proposed textual
128. See generally supra text accompanying note 17.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1970).
130. The statute provides that amendments to the Rules of Evidence go into effect
180 days following promulgation by the Supreme Court, unless blocked by a one-House
veto. The legislative veto provision is presumably invalid under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), so a rules change promulgated by the Court could only be prevented from
going into effect by affirmative legislation.
The invalidity of the veto provision should not affect the validity of the remainder of
the statute. It is clear that Congress wanted to establish a larger measure of control for
itself in relation to the rules of evidence than that authorized in the Enabling Acts for
rules of procedure, but equally clear that it did not want to require affirmative legislative
action as a prerequisite to the effectiveness of changes in the rules of evidence proposed
by the Supreme Court. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Seass.
7069-70, 7091, 7107 (committee reports). Because it is not "evident" that Congress would
have refrained from enacting the remainder of § 2076 had it known of the unavailability
of the legislative veto option, and because the portion of the statute remaining after
severance is "fully operative as a law," the statute remains valid, subject to the deletion
of the legislative veto provision. See INS v. Chadha, supra, at 931-32, 934-35 & n.9; Brief
for the United States at 12-13, 16-20, Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
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amendment with a supporting statement along the lines of this
Report to the Chief Justice, recommending that the Rules be
amended in the manner indicated. As a practical matter, a pro-
posal of this sort would normally be referred for study by the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference, and the Court would await the Conference's
recommendation before acting on it affirmatively or neg-
atively. 13 1
Second, Congress can directly amend the Rules of Evidence.
Other procedural reforms which could be adopted through legis-
lation are proposed in the Truth in Criminal Justice series of
which this Report is a part. An amendment providing for the
uniform admission of criminal histories might appropriately be
included in a legislative package encompassing these proposals.
Third, we can encourage state officials to support the enact-
ment of comparable reforms in their states. This could be done,
for example, through addresses by Department officials at
NAAG or NDAA meetings, through personal contacts, and
through offers of technical and litigative assistance to state offi-
cials in formulating reform proposals of this sort and defending
their validity.
The House of Representatives has passed a bill revising the Rules Enabling Acts, H.R.
3550, that would perpetuate the Supreme Court's authority to prescribe and amend the
rules of evidence. The provision of the bill corresponding to current § 2076 deletes the
legislative veto provision in light of its invalidity under Chadha, so rules changes
promulgated by the Supreme Court could only be blocked by affirmative legislation. See
131 CONG. Ri. H11397-98 (Dec. 9, 1985).
131. The Chief Justice is the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. If a propo-
sal of the sort suggested were referred to the Judicial Conference's Rules Committee, it
would probably be referred to an ad hoc committee for study and hearings; there is no
standing advisory committee on the Rules of Evidence. If the ad hoc committee ap-
proved the proposal, it would go to the Rules Committee, and then to the Conference in
the event of a favorable recommendation by the Rules Committee.
All this preliminary process is just a matter of custom. The Supreme Court has statu-
tory authority to promulgate rules changes in its discretion, under whatever procedures
it chooses to adopt. However, the House-passed bill revising the rule-making statutes,
H.R. 3550, would provide a statutory basis for prior study and approval of proposed
rules by the Judicial Conference and its committees. See 131 CONG. Rac. H11397-98
(Dec. 9, 1985).
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B. A Proposed Amendment To The Federal Rules Of
Evidence
1. Text of the Proposed Rule
Our recommendation that criminal histories be uniformly ad-
missible could be implemented by repealing Rule 609 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which currently governs the admis-
sion of convictions for purposes of impeachment, and substitut-
ing a new rule of evidence along the following lines:132
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General rule. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
a person's conviction of a crime, elicited from that person or es-
tablished by public record, shall be admitted as evidence of his
character or a trait of his character to show that his conduct was
in conformity therewith, as evidence concerning his credibility,
and as evidence concerning any other matter to which it may be
relevant.
(b) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilita-
tion. When a conviction is admitted, evidence shall be admitted
that the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if it has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(c) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudica-
tion shall be admitted under this rule whenever the conduct to
which the adjudication relates would constitute a crime if com-
mitted by an adult.
(d) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom
does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence
of the pendency of an appeal shall be admitted.
132. The natural location for the proposed rule would be immediately before current
Rule 406. Conforming changes would be required in some other rules. Rule 404 would
continue to govern the admission of evidence of offenses that have not resulted in
convictions.
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2. Analysis of the Proposed Rule
The proposed amendment would establish a uniform rule of
admission for the criminal records of defendants and other per-
sons whose actions, state of mind, or credibility are relevant in a
case. The basic change from current law is that the purpose of
admitting convictions would not be limited to attacking credibil-
ity. This limitation is unwarranted for reasons discussed earlier
in this Report."'3 The admissibility of convictions under the pro-
posed rule would not be limited to situations in which the de-
fendant or other person testified as a witness, and prior convic-
tions, once admitted, could be considered as evidence concerning
any matter to which they may be relevant. Subsection (a) of the
proposed rule contains explicit language emphasizing that the
rule repeals the existing limitation on admitting prior convic-
tions as evidence of character or propensity"3 and that the ad-
mission of convictions to attack credibility remains legitimate.
The broadened authorization for admitting criminal records
under the proposed rule would apply to other persons as well as
defendants. This approach reflects the fact that many of the ob-
jections to existing Rule 609's restrictions may apply in relation
to other persons as well as to defendants, and the fact that a
contrary approach would open the way for criticism that defen-
dants are unfairly singled out for unfavorable treatment under
the proposed rule. 13 5 However, the practical effect of the pro-
posed changes on defendants and other persons would be quite
different.
Because the government has the burden of proof in criminal
cases, it normally cannot make its case without putting the vic-
tim and other critical witnesses on the stand. Once this is done,
prior convictions of those persons for felonies and crimina falsi
become admissible under Rule 609(a). Thus, while the proposed
rule would remove certain restrictions on the admission of prior
convictions of victims and other prosecution wit-
nesses-principally eliminating the restriction to felonies and
crimina falsi and the ten-year time limit of Rule 609(b)-it
would not expose persons other than the defendant to a type of
133. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
134. The proposed rule states that "a person's conviction of a crime . . . shall be
admitted as evidence of his character or a trait of his character to show that his conduct
was in conformity therewith." Cf. FED. R. Evm. 406: "Evidence of the habit of a person
... is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person. . . on a particular occasion was
in conformity with the habit."
135. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
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attack from which they are currently in a position to insulate
themselves."'6 The proposed rule would also not undermine the
policy of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and compa-
rable "rape victim shield laws" at the state level,137 because the
past sexual conduct of a rape victim that the defense might seek
to bring out would virtually never be a criminal offense for
which the victim has been convicted. Its practical effect on per-
sons other than defendants would generally be limited by the
fact that crime victims and other non-defendant witnesses usu-
ally do not have serious criminal records.
In contrast, the defendant under current law can normally bar
disclosure of his criminal record by staying off the stand. Even if
the defendant does take the stand, the admissibility under Rule
609(a) of a conviction other than a crimen falsi depends on a
finding by the judge that its probative value on credibility out-
weighs its "prejudicial effect to the defendant." The proposed
rule would eliminate these impediments to the search for
truth 8 by making the defendant's full criminal record admissi-
ble in every case.
The proposed rule would also benefit the prosecution by
broadening the range of convictions of defense witnesses that
can be admitted. As with prosecution witnesses, the restriction
of admissible convictions to felonies and crimina falsi within a
specific time period would be eliminated.
Other features of the proposed rule include the following:
No requirement of similarity to the charged offense. The pro-
posed rule would not condition the admissibility of prior convic-
tions on similarity to the currently charged offense, on the
ground that such similarity or dissimilarity should go to the pro-
bative value of earlier offenses rather than to their admissibil-
ity.3 9 Because similarity is a matter of degree and offenses may
be similar or dissimilar to each other in various ways,'4 0 a con-
trary rule would result in the development of a body of case law
136. Defendants are also generally free under current law to attack the character of
victims through opinion and reputation testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2), 405(a).
137. See generally supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
138. See generally supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
140. Offenses may be similar or dissimilar in constituting the same statutory offense
or in being defined by different statutes, in having similar penalties or different penal-
ties, in being directed against persons or against property, in being violent or non-vio-
lent, in being drug-related or not drug-related, in being sex crimes or in not involving a
sexual element, in being motivated by a desire for pecuniary gain or in having some
other motivation, in involving fraud or deceit or in not involving fraud or deceit, in being
"white collar crimes" or "street crimes," in being intentional or in involving some lesser
degree of culpability, etc.
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and ad hoc judgments by individual judges concerning the requi-
site type and degree of "similarity," undermining the proposal's
objective of reducing the hypertechnicality and unpredictability
that currently characterize this area of the law.
Moreover, prior offenses may be relevant to a later proceeding
for reasons unrelated to any intrinsic similarity to an offense
charged in the proceeding. For witnesses other than the defen-
dant, the main significance of prior convictions is likely to be
their relevance to the witness's credibility. The import of a non-
defendant witness's conviction of an offense for his credibility,
however, is normally unrelated to any incidental similarity it
may have to the offense with which the defendant is charged. In
relation to defendants as well, prior convictions sometimes en-
hance the plausibility of a current charge through an inferential
chain that does not depend at all on similarity."'
No restriction on types of crime. Rule 609 currently limits the
use of convictions for impeachment to felonies and offenses in-
volving dishonesty or false statement ("crimina falsi"). The rea-
sons for this restriction are essentially historical: It reflects the
derivation of the impeachment rule from a common law rule of
testimonial incapacity based on conviction of a felony or crimen
falsi 14 2
Because convictions would be admissible for any purpose
under the proposed rule-not just to "attack credibility"-there
is no reason to give crimina falsi any special status. The restric-
tion to felonies should also be dispensed with, because the pen-
alty grade of an earlier offense has no particular relationship .to
its probative value in relation to a currently charged offense. For
example, in a prosecution for failing to file a tax return, a prior
misdemeanor conviction for the same offense would normally
have greater relevance than a prior felony conviction for incest.
No time restriction. The proposed rule does not set any time
limit on the use of prior convictions. In contrast, under current
Rule 609(b), a conviction is generally inadmissible for impeach-
ment if more than ten years have elapsed from the date of con-
viction or release from confinement pursuant to the conviction,
whichever is later. Convictions outside the specified time period
are admissible only if "the court determines, in the interest of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
141. See generally supra text accompanying notes 18-20; E. IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 8, § 3:21.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
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specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prej-
udicial effect."
The time restriction under Rule 609 is apparently predicated
on the view that older convictions "generally do not have much
probative value. 14' As the basis for a rule of exclusion, this is a
non sequitur. The general principle is that evidence is relevant
and admissible if it has any probative value, but that relevant
evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.1 44 The lapse of time from a
conviction does tend to reduce its probative value, but it corre-
spondingly reduces any risk there may be of a prejudicial effect
from its admission. Because there is no reason to believe that a
predominance of prejudicial effect over probative value is more
likely in connection with older convictions than in connection
with more recent ones, there is no reason to exclude older
convictions.
Moreover, any difference in typical probative value between
older and more recent convictions is a matter of degree. There is
no reason to believe that there is any sudden falling off in proba-
tive value at the end of a ten-year period, or at the end of any
other number of years that might be specified. Rather than fol-
lowing the arbitrary line-drawing approach of the current rule,
the proposed rule imposes no time limit on the use of convic-
tions. The lapse of time from a conviction would be considered
by the trier as a factor bearing on its probative value.'4 5
Effect of pardons, certificates of rehabilitation, etc. Current
Rule 609(c) provides that a conviction is inadmissible if (1) it
has been the subject of a certificate of rehabilitation or
equivalent procedure, unless the person has subsequently been
convicted of a felony, or (2) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon on grounds of innocence or equivalent procedure
based on a finding of innocence.
The proposed rule follows current subsection (c) in excluding
convictions that were later nullified by pardons on grounds of
innocence or equivalent determinations of innocence, but adopts
143. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7061-62; see H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in id.
at 7075, 7085.
144. See FED. R. EvID. 401-403. Rule 403 also authorizes the exclusion of relevant
evidence based on countervailing considerations of efficiency, but those considerations do
not apply significantly to the admission of convictions. See supra text accompanying
notes 38-40, 117.
145. Under the conventional impeachment rule, the general view was that the lapse
of time from a conviction affects its probative weight but not its admissibility. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]
Journal of Law Reform
a different approach to indicia of rehabilitation. The specific
rule on this point under current law is too restrictive. Suppose,
for example, that a person is convicted for a misdemeanor "false
statement" offense, later obtains a certificate of rehabilitation,
but is subsequently convicted again for another misdemeanor of
the same type. The later offense would show that the person had
not in fact been rehabilitated, but the earlier conviction would
be withheld from the trier under current law in light of subsec-
tion (c)'s provision that only subsequent felonies negate the ex-
clusionary effect of a certificate of rehabilitation.
A broader problem with the current rule is that there seems to
be no adequate reason why its provision relating to certificates
of rehabilitation and the like is formulated as a rule excluding
convictions rather than a rule admitting indicia of rehabilitation.
Under the proposed rule, the trier would receive the full record
of a person's convictions that have not subsequently been over-
turned or nullified by a later determination of innocence, and
would be free to assess its significance in light of all the evidence
in the case, including later determinations of rehabilitation.14
Admissibility of juvenile adjudications. Under current Rule
609(d), a defendant's juvenile adjudications are never admissible
for impeachment. However, juvenile adjudications of witnesses
other than defendants are admissible if the court determines
that their admission "is necessary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence."
The Advisory Committee Note relating to current subsection
(d) is essentially an apologetic statement which notes various ar-
guments that have been offered for limiting the use of juvenile
adjudications but also notes that good responses can be made to
these arguments. The only reason given by the Advisory Com-
mittee for the favored position under the rule of defen-
dants-whose juvenile adjudications are never admissible-is
that this approach is "[iln deference to the general pattern and
policy of juvenile statutes." However, one would suppose, for ex-
ample, that a trier responsible for deciding on the truth of a
charge of rape against a nineteen-year-old has a legitimate inter-
est in knowing that he was found guilty of similar offenses at the
146. Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(e) (1962) (conviction vacated on grounds
of rehabilitation is admissible for impeachment but vacating order is also admissible).
The advisory committee note to current Rule 609(c) justified its approach by saying
that "[tihe alternative of allowing in evidence both the conviction and the rehabilitation
has not been adopted for reasons of policy, economy of time, and difficulties of evalua-
tion." The note did not attempt to explain in any greater detail how admitting certifi-
cates of rehabilitation and comparable documents would give rise to these problems.
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ages of seventeen and fifteen in juvenile proceedings, to the
same extent as with older offenders and non-defendant
witnesses.
While existing law does reflect a policy of protecting the confi-
dentiality of juvenile records under various circumstances, con-
victing the guilty and acquitting the innocent are also important
policy objectives, which may be disserved if the juvenile records
of defendants or witnesses are concealed from the trier. The pol-
icy of non-disclosure in relation to juvenile records must also ap-
pear less forceful than it did at the time the Rules of Evidence
were promulgated, because the trend of recent legal develop-
ments has been to reduce the distinction between juvenile and
adult adjudications and to relax confidentiality requirements for
juvenile records. 1 7 The proposed rule provides simply that juve-
nile adjudications are to be admitted on the same terms as adult
convictions.
Pendency of appeal. The final subsection of the proposed rule
perpetuates current Rule 609(e), which provides that the pen-
dency of an appeal from a conviction does not limit the convic-
tion's admission, but that evidence of the pendency of the ap-
peal is admissible.
CONCLUSION
Under existing law, the most important evidence of the char-
acter and disposition of defendants and other persons involved
in criminal cases is frequently withheld from the trier. This
practice is at odds with normal canons of judgment in extra-ju-
dicial contexts, with the practice of considering a defendant's
criminal history in pretrial and posttrial proceedings, and with
the law of many other democracies. By concealing an important
type of relevant evidence from the ultimate decisionmaker on
the question of guilt or innocence, the existing rules in this area
disserve the search for truth. The manifest tension that exists
between the conventional presumption against admitting evi-
dence of prior offenses and the desire to do justice has also re-
sulted in gross distortions in the law, producing a hodgepodge of
ill-conceived exceptions and qualifications to the general rule of
exclusion.
147. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032, 5038 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (broadened authoriza-
tions for prosecuting juveniles as adults and maintaining records on juvenile offenders
enacted by Comprehensive Crime Control Act).
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The most plainly warranted reform in this area would be a
repeal of the rule limiting the admission at trial of evidence of
prior offenses whose commission has been established by crimi-
nal convictions. The case for admitting such evidence is particu-
larly compelling and the conventional grounds supporting the'
exclusion of character evidence are insubstantial where that evi-
dence is in the form of a conviction for a crime. The Department
should support an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence
that would implement this reform-a uniform rule of admission
for the record of a person's criminal convictions at trial.
